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Introduction 
Anybody who thinks that you can win these kinds of things 
 in one dimension is not being honest. 
 
Gen Peter Schoomaker, USA 
   September 20061 
 
Is America’s counterinsurgency (COIN) effort being shortchanged? Does 
a one-dimensional doctrine fail to exploit America’s full COIN potential? 
Would a genuinely joint approach provide better options to decision-
makers confronted with the harsh realities of twenty-first century 
insurgencies? 
 
This study insists the answers are unequivocally “yes.” It analyzes the 
pitfalls of accepting Army/Marine tactical doctrine as the joint solution. It 
also offers insights and ideas from an Airman’s perspective for 
strengthening joint COIN doctrine development in order to deliver fresh 
alternatives to our national decision-makers and combatant commanders. 
 
Of central importance to this assessment is the Army’s December 2006 
Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (designated by the Marine 
Corps as Warfighting Publication 3-33.5).2 This impressive and 
influential3 282-page document skillfully addresses many difficult COIN 
issues, but regrettably reflects a one-dimensional, ground-centric 
perspective almost exclusively, as evidenced by the fact that considera-
tions of airpower are confined to a short, five-page annex.  
 
By failing to reconcile the full potential of today’s airpower capabilities 
and by focusing almost exclusively on the surface dimension, FM 3-24— 
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despite its many virtues and remarkable insights—nevertheless falls short 
of offering US decision-makers a pragmatic, overall solution for the 
challenge of counterinsurgency.  
 
Yet, despite FM 3-24’s limitations, it has become viewed as the overall 
plan for COIN operations in Iraq.4 Of further concern are reports that FM 
3-24 appears poised to become the centerpiece of new joint COIN doctrine 
whose development has just begun.5 This paper argues that winning COIN 
fights requires exploiting the potential of the entire joint team. 
 
Simply Two-Service Doctrine or “The Book” on Iraq? 
 
One FM 3-24 contributor insists that it is “simply operational level 
doctrine for two Services [with] no strategic agenda.”6 Of course, there is 
absolutely nothing wrong with services or components developing 
doctrines and approaches that optimize their capabilities,7 or even taking 
positions that single-service/component solutions are best in specific 
situations.8 In fact, the evidence of “one-dimensional” success sometimes 
can be strong. According to Tom Ricks’ book, Fiasco, it was 1998’s 
airpower-only Operation Desert Fox bombing campaign that ended Iraq’s 
hopes of a nuclear weapons program.9 
 
However, counterinsurgency operations arguably present a more difficult 
and multifaceted problem that defies solution by any one component. 
Despite the ferocious efforts and eye-watering valor of America’s Soldiers 
and Marines, 10 the various COIN strategies for Iraq proffered by ground-
force leaders over the years simply have not succeeded.11 Exploiting the 
full capabilities of the whole joint team is plainly—and urgently—needed. 
 
Clearly, FM 3-24, the latest ground-force scheme for Iraq, is being 
understood as much more than the doctrine of “two Services.” As the 
media reports, it has become “The Book” on Iraq.12 More than that, 
Senator John McCain typifies the view of many senior leaders (and 
probably the public at large) in describing the manual as the “blueprint of 
US efforts in Iraq today.”13 Thus, despite its inadequate treatment of  
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airpower, “received wisdom” holds that FM 3-24 is a comprehensive 
solution applicable to the whole joint team conducting COIN operations in 
Iraq. 
 
Such assumptions are understandable, and not just because a ground-
centric DOD announcement wrongly insinuates just such a conclusion.14 
FM 3-24 is not, for example, entitled Landpower in Counterinsurgency 
Operations, but simply Counterinsurgency. More importantly, FM 3-24’s 
preface does not describe it as doctrine aimed merely at ground operations, 
but grandly characterizes the manual—without limitation or qualifi-
cation—as doctrine for “military operations” in “counterinsurgency… 
environments.”15 
 
This description certainly includes all operations in Iraq,16 but the doctrine 
evidently is not intended to be limited to that conflict. While 
acknowledging its application there, Dr. Conrad Crane,17 a highly-
respected historian who was one of the principal authors, makes no secret 
that FM 3-24 is intended for broader application: “If we’d have written a 
manual that’s only good for Iraq, we’d have failed in our mission.”18  
 
Service Parochialism or Airman Disinterest in COIN? 
 
Does this mean Airmen ought to dismiss FM 3-24 as simply a symptom of 
service parochialism? Some may say so. In discussing airpower, a recently 
retired Army chief of staff said he “believe[s]” in it, but nevertheless did 
not seem to consider it as an independent, co-equal force.19 Rather, he 
evidently views airpower as merely a kind of accessory for Soldiers that is 
“on the other end of the radio when you need something done in a 
hurry.”20 Contending it is “easy” to overstate what is “possible” with 
airpower, he mocked those who “love things that go fast, make noise and 
look shiny.”21 
 
Apparently, the ground component sees counterinsurgency as its near-
exclusive domain. For example, FM 3-24 incorrectly claims that such 
capabilities as “language specialists, military police … engineers, medical 
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units, logistical support, legal affairs [and] contracting elements” exist 
only “to a limited degree” in the Air Force and the Navy.22 Such an 
assertion is either grossly misinformed—the likely explanation—or, it 
might be said, deliberately provincial. 
 
Still, it would be a great mistake to attribute FM 3-24’s overwhelmingly 
ground-centric approach to service parochialism. Until very recently, the 
Air Force has not offered much in the way of doctrine or other 
comprehensive analysis focused exclusively on counterinsurgency.23 
Attitudes within the Air Force may be changing. As an example, the Air 
Force Doctrine Center “jump started” an effort to write service COIN 
doctrine by addressing these operations within the broader context of 
irregular warfare (IW).24 The result was published in August 2007 as Air 
Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3.25 In support of this effort during 
April of 2007, Air University sponsored a major counterinsurgency 
symposium.26 There, Maj Gen Richard Y. Newton III, the Air Force’s 
assistant deputy chief of staff for operations, plans and requirements, 
declared the Air Force needed to “acknowledge and embrace COIN and 
IW as major missions.”27 
 
Nonetheless, with some notable exceptions, too few Airmen have been 
effective and articulate advocates of airpower generally,28 especially in 
recent years.29 Accordingly, it might be expected that most in the land 
component, including those involved in COIN, see the Air Force as 
merely an adjunct to their operations and “incapable of winning a decisive 
victory or even controlling events on the ground.”30 After all, it is a basic 
Army belief that an enemy force can “endure punishment from the air” but 
cannot “ignore the application of military force on its own land.”31 
 
The shortage of thinking about the role of airpower in COIN is not new. 
As early as 1998, Col Dennis Drew argued that “to a large extent, the Air 
Force has ignored insurgency as much as possible, preferring to think of it 
as little more than a small version of conventional war”—a view many  
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observers believe persists today.32 In the summer of 2006, Dr. Grant 
Hammond of Air University lamented that there is a “general disinterest” 
in COIN among Airmen.33 
 
The reasons for this apparent aversion to COIN are debatable, but a 2006 
RAND study reveals a plausible rationale. It observes that historically 
“insurgencies do not present opportunities for the overwhelming 
application of the air instrument.”34 Accordingly, “air power has been used 
in a less-visible supporting role.”35 Most analysts to date seem to agree 
with this “supporting role” assessment. The bulk of COIN literature,36 to 
include much authored by Airmen, rarely offers innovative ideas for a 
more expansive use of airpower.37 
 
By contrast, the Army and Marine Corps have done a lot of thinking about 
COIN in the past few years. Both services did an outstanding job in 
assembling a team of some of the nation’s top ground-warfare experts to 
develop FM 3-24. These included such formidable intellects as Col Peter 
Mansoor38 and LTC John Nagl39—both Army officers with PhDs to 
complement their extensive combat records. Nagl, for instance, is the 
gifted young author of the extremely well-received book, Learning to Eat 
Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Vietnam,40 
which is one of the primary texts the manual’s writers relied upon. 
 
The entire effort was supervised by yet another respected PhD-warrior, 
“one of the Army’s premier intellectuals,”41 an individual “skilled” at 
“befriending journalists,”42 and someone with “many friends in 
Congress,”43 Gen David H. Petraeus, who is now implementing FM 3-24 
as the commander of the Multinational Force in Iraq.44 Yet, despite this 
enormous collection of talent and the many vitally important insights and 
concepts they incorporated into FM 3-24,45 the doctrine produced is 
nonetheless incomplete. 
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FM 3-24 as an Incomplete Doctrine 
 
How is FM 3-24 an incomplete doctrine for the problem of counter-
insurgency? Among other things, it “undervalues technology, misunder-
stands key aspects of twenty-first century warfare and, frankly, 
marginalizes air power.”46 To address these deficiencies (specifically in 
light of the nascent work toward developing comprehensive joint COIN 
doctrine), this essay argues that several central concepts about airpower—
and Airmen—ought to inform COIN doctrine and strategies in order to 
realize the full benefits of a joint and interdependent team.  
 
This essay also takes the view that a truly comprehensive and joint COIN 
doctrine would necessarily emphasize recent developments in airpower 
technology and techniques. Taken together, they make obsolete the 
attitude permeating FM 3-24 (as well as most other COIN writings) that 
always relegates airpower to a tangential “supporting role.”47  
 
Today’s airpower (in contrast to the then existing airpower capabilities in 
many of the classic COIN efforts FM 3-24 relies upon) can be a decisive 
element in a truly joint COIN strategy. Because it offers opportunities to 
replace manpower with technology, airpower may, in fact, be essential to 
forming genuinely pragmatic options for American decision-makers 
confronted with the kinds of intractable insurgencies that mark the twenty-
first century. 
 
Importantly, when this monograph speaks of “airpower” it does not 
employ the somewhat outdated official Air Force definition,48 but rather 
takes its meaning from the Air Force’s current mission statement to 
include air, space, and cyberspace power in all their many forms.49 A 
caution: this reference to the Air Force’s mission statement does not mean 
that airpower should be read exclusively to mean the US Air Force. 
Although the United States has only one Air Force, the air and missile 
arms of other services are vital elements of American airpower.  
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Airmindedness 
 
A key thesis of this study is that the value of an Airman’s50 contribution to 
the counterinsurgency debate is not limited to airpower capabilities, per 
se, and does not depend upon the existence of “opportunities for the 
overwhelming application of the air instrument” in particular COIN 
scenarios.51 Yes, Airmen do bring distinct weaponry to the COIN fight, 
but equally—or more—important is the Airman’s unique way of thinking. 
 
Gen Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold termed the Airman’s “particular expertise 
and distinct point of view … airmindedness.”52 According to Air Force 
doctrine, an Airman’s “perspective is necessarily different; it reflects the 
range, speed, and capabilities of aerospace forces, as well as the threats 
and survival imperatives unique to Airmen.”53 An Airman’s approach to 
military problems, including COIN, may differ markedly from that of a 
Soldier.54 Taking advantage of the Airman’s way of thinking will optimize 
joint COIN doctrine because, among other things, the Airman is less 
encumbered by the kind of frustrations the ground forces suffer in battling 
a vicious and intractable foe without the expected success. 
 
True, some counterinsurgency operations in certain circumstances are 
optimally executed by ground forces as FM 3-24 promotes.55 The design 
of even those operations, however, always ought to reflect careful 
consideration of not just the technology and capabilities of the whole joint 
team but also the unique war-fighting perspective each service and 
component brings to the analysis. 
 
Authentic Jointness? 
 
Possibly as a result of Airmen’s criticisms of FM 3-24, a forum to bring 
all the services’ COIN perspectives together may be emerging.56 In late 
May 2007, over five months after FM 3-24 was declared The Book on 
Iraq, the four military services agreed to publish joint COIN doctrine.57 
This development presents the ideal opportunity to meld the strengths of 
the whole joint team into a unified doctrinal concept. 
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Significantly, Inside the Pentagon announced that the “Army will lead the 
pan-service effort.”58 Alone, this is not problematic; however, it does raise 
concerns when juxtaposed with the further report that “several officials” 
said that FM 3-24 will serve “as a primary building block for the new 
service-wide effort.”59 It remains to be seen what a doctrine development 
architecture so constructed will produce.  
 
With the Army leading the effort and the express intention to rely upon the 
Army’s existing counterinsurgency doctrine as a “primary building block” 
for the new joint doctrine, the issue is whether the process will be 
sufficiently open to innovative concepts, especially those that might 
contradict any of FM 3-24’s central tenets. Ideally, the process should 
focus on competitive analysis of component approaches, and select those 
elements that will serve the COIN fight best. 
 
A complete COIN analysis for implementation in the joint environment 
must benefit from an airminded perspective. That means taking into 
account the potential of airpower technologies as well as the Airman’s 
distinct approach to resolving issues across the spectrum of conflict. In 
short, a fully joint and interdependent approach will produce the most 
effective doctrine for the COIN fight. 
 
FM 3-24’s Ground-Force Conventionality 
Soldiers praise FM 3-24 as “brilliantly” created,60 a proposition with 
which Airmen would agree. Airmen, however, would also find that its 
defining provisions espouse rather standard ground-force philosophies. In 
fact, what is paradoxical61—given the publicity surrounding FM 3-24—is 
its surprisingly conventional approach to unconventional war. In 
particular, it reverts to much the same solution Soldiers typically fall back 
upon when confounded by a difficult operational situation, COIN or 
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otherwise: employ ever larger numbers of Soldiers and have them engage 
in “close” contact with the “target,” however defined. 
 
At its core, FM 3-24 enthusiastically reflects the Army’s hallowed concept 
of “boots-on-the-ground.”62 It is an approach sure to delight those63 (albeit 
not necessarily the manual’s authors) who conceive of solutions to all 
military problems mainly in terms of overwhelming numbers of ground 
forces. And the numbers of “boots” FM 3-24 demands are truly 
significant. It calls for a “minimum troop density” of 20 counterinsurgents 
per 1,000 residents.64 This ratio (which may be based on “questionable 
assumptions”65) has enormous implications for the US’s COIN effort in 
Iraq. For Baghdad alone, the ratio would require over 120,000 troops;66 for 
all of Iraq more than 500,000.67 
 
FM 3-24 seems to conceive of accumulating combat power not through 
the massing of fires, as would normally be the case, but by massing COIN 
troops. Both Airmen and Soldiers recognize the importance of mass68 as a 
principle applicable to COIN as with any other form of warfare. To an 
Airman, however, mass is not defined “based solely on the quantity of 
forces” but rather in relation to the effect achieved.69 Although doctrinally 
the Army recognizes the concept of effects,70 FM 3-24 seems to see the 
means of achieving them primarily through deploying ground forces. 
 
The manual’s predilection for resorting to large force ratios of Soldiers to 
address the challenge of COIN caters to the Army’s deeply-embedded 
philosophies. For example, the service begins both its seminal doctrinal 
documents, FM 1, The Army,71 and FM 3-0, Operations,72 with the same 
quote from T. R. Fehrenbach. It is from This Kind of War, his book about 
the Korean conflict, and it glorifies the boots-on-the-ground approach: 
 
You can fly over a land forever; you may bomb it, atomize 
it, pulverize it and wipe it clean of life but if you desire to 
defend it, protect it, and keep it for civilization you must do 
this on the ground, the way the Roman Legions did, by 
putting your young men into the mud.73 
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The selection of the Fehrenbach quote to introduce documents so central 
to the Army suggests that the institution harbors something of an anti-
airpower (if not anti-technology) bent. That the Army still clings to a 
vision of airpower from a conflict nearly 60 years past says much about 
the mindset and culture being thrust upon today’s Soldiers. 
 
Airmen must, nonetheless, understand and respect that the Army is rightly 
the proud heir to a long tradition whose ideal might be reduced in “heroic” 
terms to a close combat contest of champions on the order of Achilles and 
Hector.74 The centerpiece of such struggles often is not the weapons the 
warriors brandish, but the élan with which they wield them.  
 
The Army still views the infantry as the “Queen of Battle”75 and considers 
the infantryman the quintessential Soldier whose mission is “to close with 
the enemy” and engage in “close combat.”76 Moreover, Gen David 
Petraeus, the principle architect of FM 3-24, romanticized the ideal of 
close combat when he recently remarked that there “is something very 
special about membership in the ‘brotherhood of the close fight.’”77 
 
Without question there are—and will always be—many situations (in 
COIN operations as well as in others) where it is prudent and necessary 
for ground forces to close with the enemy. The problem is that FM 3-24 
discourages combating insurgents in almost any other way.78  
 
Like most COIN writings, the manual promotes as a main objective the 
people themselves79 and aims to win their “hearts and minds.”80 To 
accomplish that, the doctrine contemplates COIN forces physically 
“closing” with the target population through various engagement 
strategies.  Unfortunately, this is a methodology frequently unsuitable for 
US forces in twenty-first century environments, including today’s Iraq (as 
will be discussed below). 
 
In other words, the same affinity for close contact in combat situations is 
applied, in virtually an undifferentiated way, to contacts in non-kinetic or 
noncombat “winning-hearts-and-minds” settings. Again, it is certainly true 
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that COIN forces will (and even must) interface with the target population 
if an insurgency is to be defeated, but the specific circumstances of when, 
where, how, and—most importantly—who are all factors that need to be 
carefully evaluated before doing so. 
 
Regrettably, FM 3-24 gives too little consideration to the possibility that 
hearts and minds might sometimes be more efficiently and effectively 
“won” without putting thousands of foreign counterinsurgents in direct 
contact with the host-nation population. Furthermore, it does not seem to 
realize that even attempting to use American troops in that role is not just 
ineffective but actually counterproductive in many COIN scenarios.81 
Consequently, inadequate delineation between COIN forces generally, and 
American forces specifically, is one of FM 3-24’s most serious conceptual 
flaws. 
 
In some instances, technology can obviate the need for massive numbers 
of boots-on-the-ground. Soldiers seem to be predisposed, as the 
Fehrenbach quote intimates, to be uncomfortable with any technology that 
might diminish or even displace the large ground formations so vital to 
their tradition-driven self-conceptualization. This kind of adherence to 
“tradition” is in stark contrast to an Airman’s way of thinking. 
COIN and an Airman’s Way of Thinking 
FM 3-24 is an exquisite illustration of the differing paths Airmen and 
Soldiers can take in addressing war-fighting matters. Considered more 
broadly, the contrasting philosophical perspectives underlay the fact that 
airpower is “inherently a strategic force.”82 Thus, Airmen tend to reason in 
strategic terms.  
 
Soldiers, however, are intellectually disposed to favor close combat and 
tend to think tactically. These tendencies are certainly not exclusive 
 12
focuses of either component—many Soldiers are extraordinary strategic 
theorists, and many Airmen have enormous tactical expertise. Rather, they 
are cultural propensities that, when recognized, are helpful in analyzing 
FM 3-24’s manpower-intensive approach. 
 
The Strategic Inclination 
 
The strategic inclination of Airmen as applied to counterinsurgency 
requires some explanation. In FM 3-24, there is no broad recognition of 
the need for anchoring all aspects of modern COIN operations in strategic 
considerations.83 Yet effective doctrine for American COIN forces today 
must account for US strategic political goals.  
 
With respect to Iraq, this means a “unified democratic Iraq that can govern 
itself, defend itself, and sustain itself, and is an ally in the War on 
Terror.”84 Thus for Airmen, the manual’s statement that “long term 
success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs 
and consenting to the government’s rule” is not quite right. If the 
government that emerges in Iraq is one that is intolerantly majoritarian, 
divided into sectarian fiefdoms, supportive of terrorism, or otherwise 
hostile to US interests, the COIN effort will have failed. 
 
Strategic thinking also means understanding “politics” in the 
Clausewitzean sense; that is, the relationship of the “remarkable trinity” of 
the people, the government, and the military.85 When COIN operations 
become disconnected from political goals and political realities, even 
technical military “success” can become strategic defeat.86  
 
Furthermore, for Airmen strategic thinking encompasses the aim of 
achieving victory without first defeating the enemy’s fielded military 
capability.87 Put a different way (that may be specially apt for COIN 
operations conducted by American troops), it means defeating the enemy’s 
military capability without excessive reliance upon the close fight; 
especially since the close fight is so costly in human terms and can 
generate intractable political issues for US decision-makers. 
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Strategic, airminded thinking can also produce means of pacifying the 
host-nation population that avoid the potential difficulties arising from 
excessive interaction by American troops with a population likely to resent 
them as occupiers. Airpower may supply such solutions. 
 
Officially, the definition of strategic air warfare88 speaks about the 
“progressive destruction and disintegration of the enemy’s war-making 
capacity to a point where the enemy no longer retains the ability or the 
will89 to wage war.” In COIN, destroying an enemy’s war-making 
capacity is a complex, multi-layered task, but the point is that an Airmen’s 
perspective90 on doing so would not necessarily require the tactical, close 
engagement by ground forces that FM 3-24 favors. 
 
Not only do Airmen naturally look for opportunities to destroy the enemy 
from afar, they also instinctively look for ways to affirmatively frustrate 
the adversary’s opportunity for the close fight. In insurgencies, the close 
fight FM 3-24 supports usually optimizes the insurgent’s odds because the 
ground dimension is typically the only one in which he can fight with a 
rational hope for success. Airmen favor denying the enemy the chance to 
fight in the way he prefers. 
 
Airmen seek “engagement dominance”91 that denies an adversary the 
opportunity to bring his weapons to bear. As a matter of doctrine, 
therefore, Airmen first seek to achieve air superiority so that airpower’s 
many capabilities can be employed with impunity.92 Generally speaking, 
American airpower achieves such dominance in COIN situations. Because 
insurgents are often (albeit not always) helpless against US airpower—and 
especially fixed-wing airpower—it represents a unique and powerful kind 
of “asymmetric” warfare93 that favors the United States, an advantage an 
effective COIN doctrine must exploit. 
 
US airpower allows Airmen to control their domains to a far greater 
degree than Soldiers have been able to achieve on the ground (particularly 
in Iraq). Much of the reason for the US’s worldwide superiority in 
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airpower is top-quality equipment. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Airmen are 
inclined towards high-technology and solutions that generate asymmetric 
military advantages. 
 
The Technological Inclination 
 
One of the most pervasive, if inexplicable, staples of COIN literature 
(including FM 3-24) is an attitude towards technology that ranges from 
overlooked to misunderstood to outright antagonistic. Much of this 
antipathy is aimed directly at airpower. Typical of the antagonistic is Air 
War College Professor Jeffrey Record’s 2006 essay that ridicules what he 
describes as the “American Way of War” as “obsessed” with a technology 
“mania” which is “counterproductive” in COIN.94 Ironically, Dr. Record 
explicitly cites the air weapon as the “most notable” cause of the counter-
productivity: 
 
The US military’s aversion to counterinsurgency … is a 
function of 60 years of preoccupation with high-technology 
conventional warfare against other states and accelerated 
substitution of machines for combat manpower, most 
notably aerial standoff precision firepower for large ground 
forces.95 
 
Even more scathing is James S. Corum’s new book, Fighting the War on 
Terror: A Counterinsurgency Strategy.96 Interestingly, his previous book, 
Airpower in Small Wars, sought to consign airpower (which he considers 
exclusively in an aircraft context97) to a limited supporting role in COIN 
campaigns.98 Although debatable, that view is at least comprehensible 
given the state of aviation technology during the time periods of the 
campaigns he examined.  
 
Corum’s current book is puzzling, however, as he appears to use it as an 
opportunity to demean technology generally and the US Air Force  
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specifically.99 However valid that perspective may have been based on 
historical studies, it does not fully appreciate the potential of today’s 
airpower in COIN strategies. 
 
Airmen and the Uses of History 
 
An Airman’s fascination with innovation, especially cutting-edge 
technological innovation, is just one of the reasons Airmen and Soldiers 
interpret the past and what it might teach differently. FM 3-24’s 
overarching intellectual touchstones are history and the Army’s lessons-
learned culture-and the doctrine is an outstanding example of both. In fact, 
its historical focus is itself one of the paradoxes of the document. While 
this emphasis gives great strength, it is also likely one of the reasons FM 
3-24 does not fully exploit airpower and other cutting-edge technological 
solutions. 
 
Instead, FM 3-24 enthusiasts gush that it “draws on lessons from history 
[and cites] Napoleon’s Peninsular Campaign, T. E. Lawrence in Arabia,100 
Che Guevara and the Irish Republican Army, as well as recent experiences 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.”101 Therein, however, lies the problem: none of 
FM 3-24’s case studies involve the very latest airpower technology.  
 
The air weapon is constantly evolving with a velocity that is difficult for 
surface warriors, with their tradition-imbued deference to the past, to grasp 
fully. Even though it draws upon Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) experiences, the manual still does not 
explore airpower’s current potential. The limits of airpower during FM 3-
24’s drafting102 (publication date of December 2006) may already have 
been superseded by recent advances (some of which are discussed 
herein103)—that is how quickly technological change can affect the air 
weapon.  
 
If utilizing all the capabilities of the joint team is important, lessons of 
past COIN operations conducted in the context of now-obsolete aviation 
technology should not be indiscriminately applied in assessing the value of 
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airpower in future COIN operations. As the new joint doctrine is drafted, 
this limitation on the uses of history must be fully understood. 
 
The swiftness of technological change has, for Airmen, real and 
immediate consequences in combat.104 The history of airpower is littered 
with examples of the rapid fall from grace of aircraft that once dominated 
the skies only to be overtaken—sometimes in mere months—by platforms 
with better capabilities.105  
 
Airmen are also confronted with the hard truth that much of today’s 
airpower capabilities are linked to computer power. For that reason , they 
are keenly aware of the Moore’s Law106 phenomena that produces rapid 
obsolescence of weaponry which relies upon the microchip.107 Naturally, 
this makes Airmen especially disposed to seek relentlessly the most 
advanced systems available. This is why the Air Force, with warplanes 
older on average than 25 years, is so focused on modernization and 
recapitalization.108 “Historical” aircraft and other older technologies have 
sentimental but not operational value to Airmen. 
 
Technologically inferior infantry weapons can maintain their relevance far 
longer than is the case with air weaponry. Other factors (e.g., organization, 
training, and spirit) may offset technological deficiencies. For example, 
the AK-47 assault rifle remains an effective weapon despite expert opinion 
that the M-16 supersedes it.109  
 
This is not the case with aerial combat. Even the most skilled and 
motivated aviator cannot overcome the physics of flight as governed by 
the aircraft’s design. Though technology does eventually transform land 
warfare, the pace of change is not nearly as rapid as it is with most 
aviation systems.  
 
It is, of course, true that there are important examples of insurgents who 
prevailed against higher-technology surface opponents. Such instances 
are, however, properly interpreted as the insurgents winning in spite of 
technological inferiority, not because of it as some contemporary COIN 
 17
enthusiasts seem to think. In an opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal, 
Bing West and Eliot Cohen made the apt observation that “the American 
failure [thus far] in Iraq reflects not our preference for high technology—
as facile critics claim—but our inability to bring appropriate technology to 
bear.”110 
 
To the frustration of Airmen,111 much ink has been spilled over the notion 
that high-tech airpower “failed” during the 2006 Israeli operations in 
Lebanon against Hezbollah.112 The supposed lesson-learned, it seems, is 
that only landpower “works” in low-intensity conflicts (to include COIN).  
 
What is ironic about these assessments is that today Israel’s border with 
Lebanon is secured by a force that is internationally manned and funded—
and which has largely ended Hezbollah rocket attacks. Not a bad strategic 
result.113 In fact, many analysts are becoming convinced, as Professor 
Edward Luttwak is, that the “the war is likely to be viewed in the long 
term as more satisfactory than many now seem to believe.”114 Moreover, if 
airpower is to be denigrated because it allegedly failed to achieve 
“decisive” results in a 34-day war, what should one make of the 
performance of groundpower in more than 1,500 days in Iraq—that 
groundpower fails as a COIN force? 
 
Even such an articulate and helpful analysis of the war as that of Susan 
Krebs (which appears in the Spring 2007 issue of Parameters115) suffers 
from an unwarranted transference of generic assessments of airpower to 
that of American airpower. Although Krebs recognizes that “no two wars 
are the same,” she nevertheless belittles airpower’s low-casualty success 
in the “Gulf War and Kosovo” by saying that those conflicts “may have 
been the anomalies.”  
 
At the same time, her analysis of Israeli airpower in the Lebanon war leads 
Krebs to propound as a “given” the proposition that the “effects of 
airpower against asymmetric adversaries” are “limited.” Underpinning that 
conclusion is the mistaken assumption that the capabilities and doctrine 
(and, perhaps, creativity) of American airpower and Airmen today is 
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conterminous with that of the Israeli Air Force at the time of the 
operations against Hezbollah. Unfortunately, this kind of lessons-learned 
thinking unproductively “fossilizes”116 judgments about the current utility 
of US airpower to the COIN fighter. 
 
To be sure, Airmen respect and study history, but they are keenly aware of 
its limits, especially as to the airpower lessons it suggests. They see 
history, as does scholar Eliot Cohen, as a “foundational component of 
education for judgment.”117 Importantly, Dr. Cohen insists that he does not 
want his students to “learn the lessons of history” as they “do not exist” 
but rather to “think historically.” Airmen would agree. 
 
Airmen would also agree with General Petraeus,118 who said (albeit more 
than 20 years ago) that while history has “much to teach us” it “must be 
used with discretion” and not “pushed too far.”119 This is especially so 
with respect to strategizing COIN doctrine for Iraq. One former Soldier 
maintains that since the conflict there “has mutated into something more 
than just an insurgency or civil war … it will take much more than cherry-
picking counterinsurgency’s ‘best practices’ to win.”120 
 
Clearly, the unwise use of history risks, as one pundit put it, attempting to 
“wage war through the rearview mirror.”121 Misunderstanding history can 
perpetuate myths about the air weapon that hurt America’s COIN fight. 
FM 3-24’s Airpower Myths 
Institutional infatuation with the individual soldier, an affinity for the 
close fight, skepticism toward new technology, and over-reliance on 
historical case studies add up to FM 3-24’s troop-centric and technology 
“light”—if not outright anti-airpower—theme. Airmen may find, however, 
that the most pernicious—and flawed—aspect of FM 3-24 is its treatment 
of the strike capability of airpower. Specifically, it admonishes ground 
commanders to 
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exercise exceptional care when using airpower in the strike 
role. Bombing, even with the most precise weapons, can 
cause unintended civilian casualties. Effective leaders 
weigh the benefits of every air strike against its risks. An 
air strike can cause collateral damage that turns people 
against the host-nation (HN) government and provides 
insurgents with a major propaganda victory. Even when 
justified under the law of war, bombings that result in 
civilian casualties can bring media coverage that works to 
the insurgents’ benefit.122 
 
While it is certainly true that air attacks can—and do—cause civilian 
casualties,123 it is not clear why FM 3-24 singles-out airpower from other 
kinds of fires, except to say it represents an astonishingly “fossilized”124 
take on current and emerging airpower capabilities. The manual looks to 
be excessively influenced by historical myths about airpower and its 
association with civilian casualties. These myths persist despite 
determined efforts by Airmen to correct the record.125 
 
While it may be excusable for ground-component officers to be unfamiliar 
with all the esoterica of the latest in airpower capabilities, it is still rather 
surprising that relatively open information about airpower’s ability to 
apply force precisely is not reflected in FM 3-24. Consider this 2003 
report from Time Magazine about the early phases of OIF: 
 
Judging from the look of the [OIF] battlefields today, the 
bombing was largely surgical. In the open market in 
Mahmudiyah, five tanks were hit from the air while they 
were parked in alleyways so narrow that their gun turrets 
could not be turned. The storefront windows a few feet 
away were blown out, but otherwise the surrounding 
buildings are intact.126 
 
Though it is fashionable in many quarters to dismiss the once-popular 
concept of the Revolution in Military Affairs,127 it is nevertheless beyond 
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debate that information technologies stimulated the “Precision 
Revolution”128 that vastly improved the accuracy of air weaponry. Most 
US attack aircraft now employ sophisticated targeting systems that 
markedly reduce the risk of civilian casualties. For example, the Litening 
targeting pod129 contains a high-resolution, forward-looking infrared 
sensor and a charged coupled device camera that permit exceptional strike 
accuracy.130 Likewise, the Sniper Advanced Targeting pod is a multi-spectral 
system that produces high-resolution imagery that “allows aircrews to 
detect and identify tactical-size targets outside … jet noise ranges for 
urban counter-insurgency operations.”131  
 
Using a whole family of satellite-guided munitions,132 US aircraft can 
strike targets with remarkable accuracy in any weather.133 Furthermore, 
upgrades to the Air Force’s E-8 Joint STARS134 aircraft can enable 
satellite-guided munitions to strike moving targets.135 
 
Besides advanced targeting systems and precision technology, the 
employment of smaller air-delivered munitions is a further reason why 
airpower is now able to minimize collateral damage. Smaller munitions 
have long allowed AC-130 gunships to provide “surgical firepower”136 
with their cannons. More recently, the MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV) was armed with the Hellfire II missile which has a warhead 
of only 20 pounds.137 Of even more significance is the deployment in late 
2006 of GBU-39B, the Small Diameter Bomb (SDB).138 This is a 
munition optimized for the COIN mission. As Lt Gen Gary L. North139 
explains: 
 
The SDB is uniquely qualified for urban targets that call for 
precision accuracy and reduced collateral damage and in 
close-air-support missions that our aircrews find 
themselves in during Operation Iraqi Freedom and 
Operation Enduring Freedom. . . . We now have the ability 
to put ordnance in places where collateral damage might be 
a concern.140 
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The air component is committed to this new capability: the Air Force is 
planning on buying 24,000 SDBs, some of which will have a composite 
casing in lieu of steel as an effort to reduce collateral damage even 
more.141 Furthermore, the Focused Lethality Munition “will combine a 
SDB casing with a new explosive fill that will confine the weapon’s blast 
effects to within 100 ft. of its detonation point.”142 
 
Beyond the targeting and munitions technology, the processes by which 
airpower is employed are proving to be as, or more, effective in 
minimizing collateral damage as those used for land-component fires. For 
OEF, the air component developed and deployed to air and space 
operations centers (AOCs)143 sophisticated methodologies and processes, 
supported by specialized computer systems, which helped minimize 
collateral damage by allowing detailed targeting and weaponeering 
analysis.144 AOC capabilities are being updated constantly, with the 
potential to eventually have the ability to “place the cursor over the object 
of interest on the control screen and have the center’s systems 
automatically generate all the options for planners and executors.”145 
 
Some of the most important elements of the process, especially for 
emerging and time-sensitive targets, are outside of the AOC. Among these 
are the ground-based Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs) that are 
part of the Air Force’s Battlefield Airmen program.146 JTACs serve with 
the ground component and ensure that the “aircrew identifies and attacks 
the correct target, minimizing the risk to friendly ground forces and 
preventing unwanted collateral damage.”147 Remarkably, JTACs equipped 
with laptop-based Remotely Operated Video Enhanced Receivers 
(ROVER) systems can “exchange live video imagery with pilots in the 
cockpit.”148  
 
Such procedural innovations, as well as the technology to support them, 
give savvy commanders confidence in using airpower. For example, 
ROVER systems are one reason “close air support missions flown by US 
Air Force pilots [in Afghanistan] increased nearly 80 percent in the first 
five weeks of 2007.”149 With proper coordination and the right technology, 
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the average response time to troops-in-contact requests for airpower from 
ground commanders has fallen to “six to seven minutes” or less.150 All of 
these efforts produced tangible results that demonstrate that airpower 
operations minimize the risk to civilians more than do ground operations. 
Human Rights Watch’s study of the major combat operations portion of 
OIF was harsher on ground forces than it was on the air component. 
Specifically, the report stated that “Human Rights Watch’s month-long 
investigation in Iraq found that, in most cases, aerial bombardment 
resulted in minimal adverse effects to the civilian population (emphasis 
added).”151 Their assessment of ground force performance was not nearly 
as positive: 
 
U.S. and U.K. ground forces were found to have caused 
significant numbers of civilian casualties with the 
widespread use of cluster munitions, particularly in 
populated areas. Moreover, in some instances of direct 
combat, problems with training on as well as dissemination 
and clarity of the U.S. ground forces’ rules of engagement 
may have, in some instances, contributed to loss of civilian 
life. 
 
Nevertheless, myths about airpower’s alleged responsibility for civilian 
casualties vis-à-vis landpower persist. In a fascinating March 2007 
column, “Shock and Awe Worked, God Help Us,” former Army officer 
turned national security commentator Bill Arkin concludes that the 
disparate treatment may be the result of the way today’s media reports.152 
 
Arkin believes that during OIF ground forces actually “caused far more 
civilian harm [than airpower] with each inch of territory it took.”153 
However, when harm occurred, there was an embedded reporter writing 
about it “from behind U.S. lines from a U.S. perspective,” who got the 
explanation for the incident from a “sympathetic observer, a comrade in 
arms.”154 
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By contrast, there were “no embeds in the cockpit, none even on most air 
bases.”155 By default, therefore, the story was “death and destruction” as 
told from an Iraqi perspective.156 This built a “heartless” and inaccurate 
“image of airpower stuck in World War II mass destruction and Vietnam 
carpet bombing.”157 In other words, the “history” of an airpower civilian-
casualty incident was often reported and recorded quite differently than 
those caused by landpower. 
 
As to FM 3-24’s concern about bombing and media coverage, the data 
show that the impact of civilian casualties on the attitudes of foreign 
populations is not as well understood as the document suggests. In a 
RAND study released in 2007, researchers found that the “public opinion 
data on foreign attitudes toward… specific instances of civilian casualties” 
were difficult to obtain resulting in assessments that were more “sketchy 
and impressionistic” than those related to US public opinion.158 
 
Furthermore, appreciation for efforts to avoid unintended civilian 
casualties can vary across cultures. This is particularly true in Arab 
societies like Iraq. RAND found that Arabs were opposed to OIF in 
principle and therefore were inclined to judge any civilian casualties 
harshly.159 Likewise, as early as 2003 Fouad Ajami reported, 
 
The Arabs are clearly watching, and seeing, a wholly 
different war. No credit is given for the lengths to which 
the architects of this campaign have gone to make the 
blows against the Iraqi regime as precise as possible, to 
spare the country’s civilians, oil wealth, and infra-
structure.160 
 
Ajami goes on to indicate that because of the influence of the mainly 
hostile Arab media, Arabs cannot be convinced that “Western 
commanders are no rampaging ‘crusaders’ bent on dispossessing Iraqis of 
their oil wealth.”161 Consequently, although FM 3-24 commendably seeks  
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to avoid insurgent exploitation of unintended civilian casualties, there is 
little evidence that such efforts create much in the way of positive feelings 
among the host-nation population, at least in the Middle East. 
 
In any event, in assessing the impact of civilian casualties on COIN 
operations, it is also vitally important to distinguish between the impact of 
foreseeable yet unintended civilian casualties (as is typically the case with 
aerial fires) and those resulting from what appears to be deliberate killings 
(which do occur with ground forces but almost never as a result of 
airpower). While it is not clear what impact civilian deaths resulting from 
unintentional actions may have, those that seem to result from the 
deliberate actions of ground forces plainly create negative opinions. 
 
Professor Mackubin Owens of the Naval War College maintains that while 
all insurgents seek to propagandize civilian deaths—even unintentional 
ones—it is “even better for the insurgents’ cause if they can credibly 
charge the forces of the counterinsurgency with the targeted killing of 
noncombatants.”162 Thus, the allegations of deliberate killings by US 
ground troops at Haditha, Hammadyia,163 Mahmudiyah,164 and elsewhere 
have been far more damaging to the COIN effort than any air-delivered 
weaponry that has gone awry. 
 
Indeed, the most devastating setback the COIN operation in Iraq has 
suffered was “collateral damage” intentionally inflicted by ground troops 
such as occurred with Abu Ghraib and related prisoner abuse scandals. Lt 
Gen Ricardo Sanchez, the Army general in command at the time, correctly 
labeled Abu Ghraib in traditional military terms as “clearly a defeat.”165 
Predictably, Abu Ghraib has had many ramifications, not the least of 
which was that the intelligence-gathering process suffered greatly.166 
 
This kind of deliberately inflicted “collateral damage”—which can only 
occur where there are boots-on-the-ground—is particularly damaging to 
the COIN effort in Iraq because it is so antithetical to the mores and values 
of Arabs. Dinesh D’Sousa explains that to some Arabs, this is worse than 
death: 
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The main focus of Islamic disgust [about Abu Ghraib] was 
what Muslims perceived as extreme sexual perversion. . . . 
Moreover, many Muslims viewed the degradation of Abu 
Ghraib as a metaphor for how little Americans care for 
other people’s sacred values, and for the kind of 
humiliation that America seeks to impose on the Muslim 
world. Some Muslims argued that such degradation was 
worse than execution because death only strips a man of his 
life, not of his honor.167 
 
To its great credit, FM 3-24 devotes an entire chapter to leadership and 
ethics,168 and contains several additional pieces of guidance all designed to 
avoid such incidents.169 Nevertheless, it is questionable whether it is 
possible to stop them entirely so long as there are troops on the ground. As 
Stephen Ambrose observes in his classic Americans at War: 
 
When you put young people, eighteen, nineteen, or twenty 
years old, in a foreign country with weapons in their hands, 
sometimes terrible things happen that you wish had never 
happened. This is a reality that stretches across time and 
continents. It is a universal aspect of war, from the time of 
the ancient Greeks up to the present.170 
 
As difficult as it is to avoid such incidents in conventional war, it is even 
more challenging in counterinsurgency. As Ambrose points out, most 
casualties in modern war come from “booby traps or snipers [or] 
landmines,” and this can enrage soldiers leaving them “very often seeking 
revenge.”171 This is exactly the problem in Iraq where improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs) are the most deadly weapon COIN forces 
face.172 According to former Army officer Dan Smith, IEDs catalyze the 
worst kind of collateral damage: war crimes. He observes in the Christian 
Science Monitor: 
 
There is pure frustration, pure anger, pure rage because 
there is no one who is the obvious perpetrator. . . . Soldiers 
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soon decide they can trust no one except their comrades . . . 
and quickly the indigenous people—all of them—become 
inferiors. Being inferior, they are less than human and 
deserve less respect, at which point one has entered the 
slippery slope that can end with a war crime.173 
 
General Petraeus174 acknowledges this is a real issue in today’s COIN 
fight. “Seeing a fellow trooper killed by a barbaric enemy can spark 
frustration, anger, and a desire for immediate revenge.”175 Petraeus was 
reacting to a startling report about ground force attitudes in Iraq. In a May 
2007 interview, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs S. Ward 
Casscells revealed the findings of a survey of Army and Marine forces: 
 
Only 47 percent of the soldiers and 38 percent of Marines 
agreed that non-combatants should be treated with dignity 
and respect. Well over a third of all soldiers and Marines 
reported that torture should be allowed to save the life of a 
fellow soldier or Marine. And less than half of soldiers or 
Marines would report a team member for unethical 
behavior.176 
 
Sometimes the frustrations of a COIN conflict can even infect the thinking 
of leaders. In a report about the allegations of misconduct by Marines at 
Haditha, the Washington Post reports that the investigating Army general 
concluded that “all levels of command” tended to believe that civilian 
casualties were a “natural and intended result of insurgent tactics.”177 This 
“fostered a climate that devalued the life of innocent Iraqis to the point 
that their deaths were considered an insignificant part of the war.”178 
 
Can better training and improved leadership prevent such incidents that in 
an era of instantaneous, 24-hour news are so damaging to COIN 
operations? Only to a degree. In a new book about military justice in 
Vietnam, Professor William Thomas Allison points out the limitations of 
even the most robust mitigating efforts: 
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The extreme nature of warfare, with its inherent fear and 
chaos, will contribute to acts of inhuman violence against 
combatants and noncombatants alike. Intensive training 
and, perhaps more so, leadership can minimize though not 
wholly prevent such acts from occurring amid the savagery 
of combat (emphasis added).179  
 
Here is a recent example from Afghanistan: After escaping an ambush, an 
elite Marine special operations platoon continued to fire at Afghan 
civilians for the next 10 miles. In the process, this presumably highly-
trained ground force killed “at least 10 people and wound[ed] 33, among 
them children and elderly villagers.”180 According to Maj Gen Frank H. 
Kearney III, head of Special Operations Command Central, his 
investigators believe the civilians killed “were innocent.”181 General 
Kearny adds that this ground-force incident “had a catastrophic outcome 
from a perceptions point of view." 182 
 
FM 3-24 is rightly concerned about collateral damage; the problem is that 
it ascribes the greatest risk to exactly the wrong source. If avoiding the 
most damaging kind of “collateral damage” is as important as FM 3-24 
claims, then reducing the size of and reliance on the ground component is 
the way to do it, not by limiting airpower. 
 
Airpower offers casualty-minimizing advantages over landpower beyond 
precision weapons and other technologies. The air weapon is largely under 
the control of highly-disciplined,183 officer-pilots operating in relative 
safety above the fray. Decisions as to the application of force can be made 
without the chaos and enormous pressure a young COIN trooper faces 
under direct attack. While mistakes can still occur, as when aviators (or 
ground controllers) misidentify friendly forces as enemy, such incidents, 
however tragic, do not have the adverse effect on host-nation populations 
that FM 3-24 is concerned about. 
 
By expressing cautions about the use of airpower that are not imposed on 
ground-force fires, FM 3-24 violates the rules of construction of good 
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doctrine by inappropriately focusing on platforms as opposed to effects.184 
With effects as the focus, analysis reveals that the manual’s reliance upon 
boots-on-the-ground actually increases the risk of incurring the exact type 
of civilian casualties most likely to create the adverse operational impact 
wrongly attributed to airpower.  
 
FM 3-24’s treatment of airpower is yet another indication of an endemic 
issue; that is, a misunderstanding of today’s airpower technology and its 
ability to be applied in a way that minimizes the risks of the most 
damaging kind of collateral damage. This is a problem that plagued 
Airmen during OEF. In his book, Airpower Against Terror: America’s 
Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, RAND analyst Benjamin 
Lambeth found:  
 
Senior leaders, both military and civilian, did not fully 
understand the accuracy and reliability of munitions, their 
destructive effects, and their ability to mitigate collateral 
damage when used properly. That led to fears of collateral 
damage on their part that were groundless.185 
Unfortunately, FM 3-24 continues this “groundless” view of current—not 
to mention emerging—airpower capabilities. A more airminded doctrine 
would correct this deficiency as well as offer fresh considerations for a 
truly joint COIN approach. 
Considerations for Airminded 
COIN Doctrine186 
What would joint counterinsurgency doctrine that includes airminded-
ness187 look like? It is well beyond the scope of this paper to provide a 
full-blown draft doctrine. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some 
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considerations, in addition to those already mentioned, that an Airman 
might bring to the development of joint COIN doctrine. 
 
To reiterate, “airminded” does not mean “air-centric” or even dominated 
by airpower. At a minimum, however, it does mean applying 
airmindedness to the problem of insurgency. Doing so provides many 
opportunities to create what COIN experts Steven Metz and Raymond 
Millen say is needed to win: an “effects-based approach designed to 
fracture, delegitimize, delink, demoralize, and deresource insurgents.”188 
What follows are a few examples of how an Airman might approach some 
of the challenges of COIN. 
 
Assess the Strategic Situation of American COIN Forces 
 
Strategic analysis is absolutely essential to success in twenty-first century 
COIN operations. Tactical and even operational excellence that does not 
account for the larger, strategic view dooms the counterinsurgency effort 
to failure. An accumulation of tactical and operational ideas, however 
valuable as savvy quick-fixes, must not be allowed to masquerade as a 
strategic analysis. As Col Joseph Celeski, USA, notes, “True strategic 
thinking on the subject of COIN and irregular warfare should consider 
time and space and the long strategic view.”189  
 
Of particular concern is the absence in FM 3-24 of almost any discussion 
of the importance of a strategic analysis of US forces in COIN situations. 
Though FM 3-24 rightly counsels sophisticated assessment of insurgent 
forces (to include the myriad of influences upon them) and discusses much 
about host-nation COIN forces, it almost never implies a similar 
examination of American COIN troops. What is indispensable is a study 
of the “correlation of forces,”190 so to speak, that arises when US troops 
are employed as COIN forces in specific situations. 
 
In the case of Iraq, this means analyzing COIN operations being 
conducted by American troops in the context of what the Iraqis consider 
an occupation following an invasion.191 This is what COIN expert  
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David Kilcullen calls a “resistance warfare” scenario.192 Such situations 
complicate the job for US forces tasked with winning hearts and minds. 
As President Bush himself recognizes: “Nobody wants to be occupied. We 
wouldn’t want to be occupied.”193  
 
Though OIF was intended as a liberation operation, it has come to be 
viewed as an occupation following a military defeat. As such, it is 
particularly distressing in an Arab culture where the psychology of shame 
and humiliation is powerful.194 That it came at the hands of what many 
Muslims see as the “Crusader” West is mortifying. It seems to confirm 
what Middle East expert Bernard Lewis asserts in What Went Wrong,195 
that is, that in the twentieth century it became “abundantly clear,” when 
compared to its “rival” Christendom, the “world of Islam had become 
poor, weak, and ignorant.”196  
 
In explaining this situation, Lewis says that Arabs eventually settled upon 
a “plausible scapegoat—Western imperialism.”197 In Iraq, such ideas have 
manifested themselves in virulent opposition to the US presence by 
powerful religious leaders. Edward Luttwak reports that both Shiite and 
Sunni clerics “have been repeating over and over again that the Americans 
and their ‘Christian’ allies have come to Iraq to destroy Islam in its 
cultural heartland and to steal the country’s oil.”198  
 
The confluence of all these circumstances may explain why, for American 
COIN forces in Iraq, FM 3-24’s approach is so difficult to implement. 
Yossef Bodansky, a noted terrorism expert, argues, 
 
The Iraqi populace, the most socially progressive society 
in the Arab world, is willingly embracing traditionalist 
radical Islam as the sole power capable of shielding 
them against American encroachment, as well as 
facilitating the humiliation, defeat and eviction of the 
hated Americans from their land and lives.199 
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Similarly, Diana West ruefully concludes that anyone with “an elemental 
understanding of institutional Islamic antipathies toward non-Muslims and 
non-Muslim culture” would reject a strategy that depends upon US forces 
winning the “trust and allegiance” of Iraqis.200 West rhetorically queries, 
“Could it be that [Iraqis] only offer allegiance to fellow-Muslims?”201 
 
All of these factors combine to create attitudes hostile to FM 3-24’s 
hearts-and-minds approach. Consider the findings of a BBC poll from 
early 2007: 
 
Among all Iraqis, support for the coalition forces is low:  
82 percent expressed a lack of confidence in them (a little 
higher than 2005), 78 percent opposed their presence and  
69 percent thought they had made the security situation 
worse. Just over half (51 percent) thought politically-
motivated attacks on coalition forces were acceptable  
(17 percent in 2004).202 
The last finding is especially problematic for a strategy that depends upon 
interspersing American COIN troops among the population. Still, none of 
this is to say counterinsurgency cannot work in Iraq; it is simply to 
illustrate the difficulties of accomplishing that task primarily via American 
boots-on-the-ground. In fact, polls show that 71 percent of Iraqis want our 
forces to leave within a year or sooner.203 It is unlikely that FM 3-24’s 
prescriptions of better cultural awareness, language training, and energetic 
interface with Iraqis will reverse these trends at this stage. 
 
Apart from Iraq, per se, US forces in the twenty-first century operate in a 
unique international context. As the sole superpower in a world of 
globalized, omni-present media, every act by American forces has the 
potential to become an incident with debilitating strategic consequences. 
This concept, as enunciated by Gen Charles C. Krulak, former 
commandant of the Marine Corps, is recognized in passing by FM 3-24.204 
Krulak said in 1999 that: 
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In many cases, the individual Marine will be the most 
conspicuous symbol of American foreign policy and will 
potentially influence not only the immediate tactical 
situation, but the operational and strategic levels as well. 
His actions, therefore, will directly impact the outcome of 
the larger operation; and he will become … the Strategic 
Corporal.205 
While Krulak’s words are as valid today as ever, there is an additional 
aspect in twenty-first century COIN operations. “Individual” US troops 
are also strategic targets for insurgents who aim to leverage their attacks 
on COIN forces for psychological value. Successful attacks against US 
soldiers can obtain legitimacy for insurgents and, indeed, even admiration 
among a population resentful of what it sees as an occupation. As 
discussed below, such attacks—and the casualties that result—erode the 
domestic support democracies need to wage war. 
 
Even in classic counterinsurgency environments, the presence of foreign 
troops can be counterproductive. In evaluating the successful COIN 
operation against communist Huk insurgents in the 1950s (an effort 
largely designed by a US Air Force officer206 but carried out without 
American forces), a Philippine officer concluded: 
 
Foreign troops are certain to be less welcome among the 
people than are the regular armed forces of their own 
government. Local populations will shelter their own 
people against operations of foreign troops, even though 
those they shelter may be outlaws…. It would be rare, 
indeed, if the use of foreign troops would not in itself doom 
to failure an anti-guerrilla campaign.207 
Ironically, the mere presence of US forces in Iraq may operate to 
disincline insurgents from coming to a peace agreement because of their 
focus on expelling the foreign troops. A US Army officer who served in 
Iraq contends that “reducing the presence of US troops” is needed to 
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create “a possible incentive for the Shiite and Sunni desert traders to barter 
for coexistence—survival and preservation of their tribal social orders.”208 
 
In short, a strategic, airminded analysis of friendly forces would highlight 
the practical difficulties of a counterinsurgency doctrine that depends on 
the extended presence of significant numbers of American land forces. 
Senior leaders recognize this conundrum. In reference to Iraq, ADM 
William Fallon, the new Central Command commander, has stated that 
“time is running out” and, therefore, has abandoned the use of the “Long 
War” as inconsistent with his “goal of reducing the U.S. military presence 
in the Middle East.”209 
 
The COIN situation in Iraq is probably best described as a “prolonged 
war” which is, as Dr. Karl Magyar says, a kind of conflict that the 
protagonists thought would be short, but which becomes unexpectedly 
extended for a variety of reasons.210 An Airman’s strategic analysis would 
operate, therefore, to advocate a strategy less reliant on US troops, to look 
for alternatives to close combat/engagement by Americans, and to be more 
open to substituting technology for manpower. In short, a doctrine better 
configured for the demands of prolonged COIN efforts. 
 
Adopt Strategy to Meet Demands of Prolonged COIN Operations 
 
Notwithstanding Central Command’s recent abandonment of the phrase, 
the United States must continue to fight “violent extremists” in what is 
still officially described as the Long War “currently centered in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.”211 If there is any principle about counterinsurgency with 
which there is little or no disagreement, it is that achieving success 
requires an extended effort.212 Reconciling this fact with available and 
realistically obtainable military capability is one of the central dilemmas 
of US COIN efforts. 
 
Because insurgencies take a long-term commitment to uproot,213 FM 3-
24’s dependence upon masses of ground forces, especially American 
troops, simply is not a sustainable strategy—clearly not for Iraq214 and 
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perhaps not for large-scale, twenty-first century COIN operations by US 
troops generally. Again, this is not to deny the many merits of FM 3-24—
or its appropriate application in certain COIN settings—it is just 
recognition of the realities of contemporary exigencies. One analyst 
cogently put it this way: 
 
The model in FM 3-24 is constructed for the classical 
counterinsurgency of ten to twelve years in duration. It may 
work in certain circumstances in which we have a shorter 
duration with which to work, but it may not and is not 
designed to. Shorter COIN campaigns are outside the 
boundary conditions for the model.215 
A strategy for today’s Iraq ought to be built around realistically “attainable 
objectives”216 as to its resource demands.217 This, for all its wisdom, FM 
3-24 does not do as applied to Iraq. Taken together, these comments 
suggest a proposition US strategists must address; that is, the phase of 
COIN operations that involves large numbers of US ground forces must be 
understood as time-sensitive and necessarily limited. 
 
Why? As Gen Wesley Clark, USA, retired, has noted, “Historically, the 
Army [has] not had staying power abroad.”218 The reasons do not relate to 
the competence, courage, or devotion to duty of US ground forces, but 
rather, according to Clark, America’s political sensitivity to soldier 
casualties in conflicts where national survival is not at risk.219  
 
This raises a significant difficulty with assumptions underlying FM 3-24. 
Sarah Sewall, one of its major advocates, argues that US forces must 
“accept greater physical risks” for the doctrine to succeed.”220 But as one 
Army official put it in explaining the rise in casualties in Iraq since FM 3-
24’s implementation there, “Taking more risk contributes to the higher 
KIA [killed in action] rate.”221 
 
For insurgents, the center of gravity222 of American COIN forces is not 
their combat capability. It is the casualty-tolerance of the US public that 
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must, in a democracy, ultimately support long-term troop deployment. An 
Army officer put it bluntly: “The enemy knows that the only real metric is 
US soldier and Marine deaths. The enemy knows that this manipulates our 
politics, media, and governance.”223  
 
Modern media practices personalize each death in ways unheard of in 
previous conflicts. Again, much of this is attributable to the relatively 
recent phenomenon of embedded reporters.224 They “become one of the 
Band of Brothers” and this gives them the ability and motivation to 
“humanize” for the American public the troops with whom they are 
assigned.225 Because of this, when troops die, the nation grieves in an 
intimate way as never before. 
 
The embedded reporter phenomenon has enabled the creation of a plethora 
of well-informed books,226 articles,227 and broadcast media reports228 that 
turn cold statistics about military casualties into sensitive stories of 
individuals, families, and tragic loss. These reports can generate 
controversy,229 but the fact remains that the casualties are personalized to 
the body politic in a truly unprecedented manner. 
 
Yet the strategic impact of casualties remains subject to debate. Some 
scholars argue that Americans will tolerate casualties if they believe that 
the war “was the right thing to do” and that there is a reasonable 
expectation of success.230 Even if those are the right measures, does the 
American public still retain a “reasonable expectation of success” in Iraq? 
Not according to a March 2007 CNN poll which found that “less than half 
of Americans think the United States can win the war in Iraq.”231 Further, 
a May 2007 poll found that 78 percent of Americans think that things are 
going “badly” in Iraq.232 One month later a poll revealed that 62 percent 
believe the United States “made a mistake sending troops to Iraq.”233 
 
In a report from early 2007, Gen Barry McCaffrey, USA, retired, 
concluded that “US domestic support for the war in Iraq has evaporated 
and will not return.”234 Paralleling this report is one relating to the views  
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of those currently in the armed forces. An Army Times poll indicates that 
the expectation of success has dropped dramatically among US troops, 
falling from 80 percent in 2004 to 50 percent in 2006.235 
 
As executed in Iraq, FM 3-24’s essential strategy (as described by 
Professor Sewall) inevitably puts US troops at greater risk.236 For 
example, American forces have recently established and manned more 
than 50 small Joint Security Stations in Baghdad,237 the idea being that the 
physical presence of COIN forces will increase the community’s sense of 
security—as a necessary element to defeat the insurgency. Nevertheless, 
these isolated centers can be difficult to defend and have already come 
under attack.238 As a Soldier noted, “These little combat outposts, they are 
more exposed: Your routes in here are very limited, and they’re definitely 
watching us.”239  
 
This tactical dilemma could create an opportunity for insurgents to 
overrun one or more of the stations. Such an event could have very 
significant strategic impact, even if in purely military terms it is 
insignificant. No less a personage than Senator John McCain has 
expressed fears of attacks by Iraqi insurgents that could “switch American 
public opinion the way that the Tet offensive did” in Vietnam in 1968.240  
 
The Tet offensive was conceived by North Vietnamese general Vo 
Nguyen Giap to stimulate a popular uprising, and involved scores of 
simultaneous attacks across the country. Although the attacks were 
repulsed with huge losses to the communist forces (the Viet Cong were 
nearly destroyed as a fighting force), the enemy nevertheless managed to 
achieve a psychological dislocation. The televised scenes of the 
unexpected attacks “shattered public morale and destroyed support for war 
in the United States.”241 
 
Apart from the strategic risks occasioned by FM 3-24’s emphasis on 
masses of boots-on-the-ground, there is the practical problem of acquiring 
those boots. Importantly, the manual does not require just huge numbers 
of COIN forces; it demands highly-trained and exceptionally talented 
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individuals with more than expert war-fighting skills. Quoting COIN 
expert David Galula, FM 3-24 says the “soldier must be prepared to 
become … a social worker, a civil engineer, a school teacher, a nurse, a 
boy scout.”242 
 
Clearly, such counterinsurgents—American or Iraqi—do not exist in the 
numbers FM 3-24 demands. Can the United States produce more anytime 
soon? Not likely. As General McCaffrey has said, to meet today’s 
manpower goals the Army has had to recruit many who hardly fit FM 3-
24’s paradigm for a COIN trooper: 
 
Generally speaking, we’ve quadrupled the number of 
lowest mental category. Generally speaking, we’ve 
quadrupled the number of non-high school graduates. 
Generally speaking, we’re putting six [thousand], seven 
[thousand], 8,000 moral criminal waivers into the armed 
forces, drug use, etcetera. Generally speaking, when you 
tell me that you think that enlisting a 42-year-old 
grandmother is the right thing to do, you don’t understand 
what we’re doing.243 
As to the latter effort, the program to enlist persons as old as age 42 has 
proven troubling,244 and recently the Army failed to meet its recruiting 
target.245 Overall, reports say “the Army is struggling to meet its [current] 
recruiting goals,”246 in part because, as Brian Mockenhaupt explains in the 
June 2007 issue of The Atlantic, 7 of 10 people in the prime group are still 
ineligible for military service despite looser quality standards.247 Even the 
Marine Corps sees challenges.248 Ominously, other media reports say that 
Army junior officers, the institution’s “seed corn,” are departing the 
service in unprecedented numbers.249 
 
Apparently, in an effort to maintain manning levels, the Army has been 
forced to make other compromises. Mockenhaupt reports: 
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When the Army softened the culture of basic training, it did 
so not to attract better recruits, but to get more bodies into 
the service and keep them there. At the same time, the 
Army is putting soldiers onto more-complex battlefields, 
where a single soldier’s actions can hinder the war effort in 
far-reaching and long-lasting ways.250 
Although the Army obviously has worked hard to recruit and retain251 
those who might have, or could easily acquire, the skills Galula 
describes,252 it appears that the only near-term way to generate the quality 
and numbers of COIN forces (which FM 3-24 indicates an effort like that 
in Iraq needs) is to induct vast numbers of elites who are not currently 
serving.253 Since the prospect of sizeable numbers volunteering is virtually 
nil, what FM 3-24, in effect, requires is a draft. 
 
Few things are more controversial in American national security thinking 
than the wisdom of a draft. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss 
the many aspects of the issue, but suffice to say that DOD recently 
reiterated its opposition to conscription.254 Regardless of DOD’s position 
and the question of whether the American people would support a draft, 
one could reasonably conclude that people forced to don a uniform are not 
necessarily the right troops to deploy abroad to perform the complex tasks 
FM 3-24 assigns to COIN forces.255 
 
All of this goes to a central difficulty with FM 3-24’s construct for COIN 
operations involving US forces: COIN operations rarely mobilize US 
national will because they almost never involve existential threats. While 
Americans will serve and will tolerate enormous casualties in military 
operations if the goal is deemed worthy enough,256 the problem with 
calling for the necessary sacrifice in COIN situations is that US interests—
and not just in Iraq—are almost always indirect. Although succeeding in 
Iraq is extremely important, nothing an Iraqi insurgent does can jeopardize 
the very existence of the United States—as other security threats can. 
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Again, this is not unique to Iraq. Historically, COIN operations seldom, as 
Jeffrey Record observes, “engage core U.S. security interests.”257 The 
absence of an existential threat in COIN conflicts militates decisively 
against the political viability of employing a draft to obtain the size and 
quality of COIN forces FM 3-24 insists upon. It also presents real limits 
on support for COIN strategies involving the kind of risk that will 
inevitably increase US casualties. 
 
In a recent New York Times essay author Rory Stewart put it bluntly, 
“American and European voters will not send the hundreds of thousands 
of troops the counterinsurgency textbooks recommend, and have no wish 
to support decades of fighting.”258 The question is the “staying power” of 
non-indigenous COIN forces. 
 
Unlike landpower, airpower does have staying power much because it has 
relatively low cost and does not present the enemy with many 
opportunities to inflict casualties. It also does not necessarily require 
basing in the nation confronted by the insurgency. Staying power is 
illustrated by the fact that US Airmen have fought in the Middle East for 
over 16 years. That includes successfully enforcing the no-fly zone over 
Iraq for more than 11 years, an operation during which not a single aircraft 
was lost.  Importantly, the small “footprint” effort did not generate much 
domestic or even foreign opposition.  
 
This is not to suggest that greater exploitation of airpower in today’s 
COIN environment in Iraq would be risk free, but merely to say that—
relative to the massive ground forces adherence to FM 3-24 requires—its 
costs are more in line with the sacrifice Americans are willing to make. By 
using technology to reduce the need for manpower, airpower can 
minimize the enemy’s opportunity to affect American will while inflicting 
a debilitating sense of helplessness on the enemy. 
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Exploit the Psychological Impact of American Airpower 
 
As thorough a job as FM 3-24 does in reviewing previous conflicts 
involving nontraditional adversaries, it does not incorporate the 
implications of the psychological dimension of today’s airpower. The 
following discussion is not about the much-debated impact of airpower on 
civilian morale, but rather how today’s precision capabilities influence the 
morale of combatants. It is about targeting the insurgents’ hearts and 
minds.259 For example, understanding how airpower drove the Taliban and 
its Al-Qaeda allies from power in Afghanistan is essential to designing the 
effective use of the air weapon in future COIN operations. 
 
Defeating the Taliban was a formidable challenge. Afghanis are among 
the world’s most fearsome fighters and have enjoyed that reputation for 
thousands of years. The Soviets sought to tame them with an enormous 
application of raw combat power but ultimately failed. Yet, the United 
States was able to oust the Taliban and Al-Qaeda from power in a matter 
of weeks. How? By inflicting helplessness in a way that only the newest 
developments in airpower can accomplish. 
 
Technology the Soviets did not possess and strategy they could not 
employ in the 1980s enabled US airpower to be decisive in Afghanistan 
two decades later. Russian aviators had neither the sensor suite nor the 
precision technology of today’s US airpower. Typically, Soviet pilots 
were obliged to fly low enough to acquire their targets visually, which 
caused devastating aircraft losses once the mujahadeen acquired 
American-made Stinger antiaircraft missiles.260 Although the Russians 
devised various tactics to counter that threat,261 the missiles eventually 
forced them to the safety of higher altitudes that, in turn, caused accuracy 
and combat effectiveness to suffer.262 
 
Unlike the Soviets in the 1980s, US airpower inflicted devastating, highly-
accurate attacks not just by tactical aircraft but also by heavy bombers 
flying at altitudes that rendered what air defense the Taliban had 
completely ineffective. According to Gen Tommy Franks, the newly-
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acquired linkage of ground-based controllers263 to “B-52s orbiting high 
above the battlefield proved even more lethal than military theorists could 
have imagined.”264 Enemy forces in long-held positions often never saw or 
heard the plane that killed them. This new-style air onslaught rapidly 
collapsed enemy morale and resistance. 
 
And it was accomplished with minimal risk to US personnel. One 
discouraged Afghani told the New York Times that “we pray to Allah that 
we have American soldiers to kill,” but added gloomily, “these bombs 
from the sky we cannot fight.”265 It was not just the heavy bombers that 
the Taliban found so dispiriting; it was also the precision fire of AC-130 
gunships—another weapon the Soviets did not possess. An Afghan ally 
related to General Franks that the gunship is “a famous airplane … [its] 
guns have destroyed the spirit of the Taliban and the Arabs.”266 
 
These capabilities capture one of the foremost features of contemporary 
American airpower in COIN situations: the ability to impose the 
psychology of “engagement dominance”267 on otherwise dogged 
adversaries. It is not fear of death that extinguishes the will to fight in such 
opponents; it is the hopelessness that arises from the inevitability of death 
from a source they cannot fight that unhinges them.  
 
Impotence in the face of superior weaponry and the denial of a meaningful 
death crush war-fighting instincts. Essentially, this is an exploitation of an 
inherent fear in soldiers of all cultures: to be confronted by technology 
against which they cannot fight. Even experienced soldiers can be driven 
to near-panic as happened when British soldiers faced German tanks 
during World War II with inadequate weaponry.268  
 
The psychological effect of the infliction of helplessness by air attack may 
exceed the physical effects. Commenting on British use of airpower to 
suppress insurgencies in Arab territories during the 1920s and 1930s, Sir 
John Bagot Glubb concluded that although aircraft do not generally inflict 
heavy casualties, “their tremendous moral effect is largely due to the 
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demoralization engendered in the tribesman by his feelings of helplessness 
and his inability to reply effectively to the attack (emphasis added).”269 
 
It might be said that American precision airpower creates something of an 
analogy (on a much larger and effective scale) to the effect that insurgents 
try to impose on US and other friendly forces through the use of IEDs. 
The seeming randomness, unpredictability, and persistence of these 
attacks are meant as much to destroy morale as to cause casualties. 
Although the Air Force does not use IEDs, its use of aerial weapons 
produces many of the same morale-destroying and stress-inducing effects. 
The difference is that the Air Force uses such weapons against legitimate 
military targets, and it can employ them in vastly greater numbers.  
 
Properly employed,270 the air weapon can impose “friction” and extreme 
psychological stress on insurgents. Airmen now271 have a new weapon to 
carry out such devastating attacks, the MQ-9 Reaper UAV.272 Four times 
heavier than the Predator UAV, and with a weapons load equivalent to 
that of the A-10,273 the Reaper represents a new generation of “hunter-
killer” aircraft that can relentlessly pursue insurgents at zero risk of a loss 
of an American. 
 
None of this should suggest Airmen believe that COIN operations ought to 
be resolved exclusively through the use of force. What it does say is that 
there is still a place for its aggressive, offensive use as an important part of 
a holistic COIN doctrine, even in the highly-scrutinized operations of the 
twenty-first century. Nor does it mean that airpower is the only force to be 
used when force is required. As OEF demonstrates, airpower along with 
allied forces on the ground enhanced by tiny numbers of US Special 
Forces can produce results that minimize risk to Americans. 
 
Clearly, however, not all airminded approaches to COIN involve kinetic 
attacks against insurgents. Airmen can also help devise non-kinetic 
approaches to aid the host-nation population caught in the violence. 
 
 43
Replace Clear-Hold-Build with Hold-Build-Populate 
 
As one of its central means of assisting the host-nation population, FM 3-
24 advocates a “clear-hold-build” strategy that requires COIN forces to 
“eliminate insurgent presence” in selected areas, followed by efforts to 
keep the location secure and to rebuild host-nation institutions.274 In Iraq, 
this strategy is being executed with concentration on the “hold” portion.275 
While “hold” and “build” make obvious sense, the “clear” portion is 
proving difficult276—and worrisome as it inevitably puts US troops in 
confrontations with the Iraqi population, at least 51 percent of whom 
approve of attacks on American forces.277 
 
Airmen, disposed to look for opportunities to deny insurgents the 
opportunity for the close fight, might offer an alternative, one that might 
be called “hold-build-populate.” It would concentrate on the 49 percent of 
Iraqis who do not approve of attacking US troops by creating safe havens 
for them, especially for the middle class so essential for Iraq’s survival. 
This approach would identify abandoned areas, rehabilitate them so they 
could be self-sustaining in essential services, secure them, and populate 
them as suggested below. (An alternative would be to address areas 
already populated if invited by the residents.) 
 
The newly-opened Rule of Law Complex in Baghdad, a fortified “Green 
Zone” for legal infrastructure, proves this concept is doable. The complex 
is designed to “bring police, judicial/jail functions to a secure 
environment.”278 Importantly, the complex also provides residences and 
other living facilities for Iraqis providing these essential services. It is a 
self-contained haven that permits Iraqis to solve Iraqi problems without as 
much distraction as the ongoing chaos outside of the complex could 
otherwise impose. 
 
Efforts to create some “gated communities” are already underway.279 
Whenever possible, these enclaves ought to include all religious groups so 
as to promote pluralism. It might also be possible to build them from the 
ground up—a process that would have the additional benefit of creating 
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jobs in an environment where unemployment is aiding the insurgency.280 
The ongoing construction of the massive US Embassy compound281 is but 
one example that shows it is still possible to build “communities” in Iraq. 
 
This proposal is not just a variation on FM 3-24’s clear-hold-build 
strategy; it is actually a modest implementation of the “oil-spot strategy” 
Andrew Krepinevich championed in Foreign Affairs.282 It also shares 
some of the attributes of the Hamlet Program from the Vietnam era.283 
There are, however, some differences.  
 
Realistically, it may be wise to focus on developing smaller, self-
contained areas like the prototype Rule of Law Complex aimed at specific 
governmental infrastructure that addresses such fundamental needs as 
schools, hospitals, water, power, and sewerage. Addressing the basic 
needs of the host-nation population can greatly facilitate COIN success.284 
 
Obviously, such compounds need to be large enough to provide a 
meaningful economy of scale and to avoid the risks the small Joint 
Security Stations in Baghdad engender. Further, those wishing to reside in 
these areas would be vetted for security purposes. Regardless, modest-
sized projects provide the opportunity for the “early success” that Galula 
says is so important to ultimate victory in counterinsurgency.285 Besides, 
when security and development projects have gotten too large and too 
ambitious, they have foundered in past COIN efforts.286  
 
The point is that under this approach the risk to American COIN forces is 
smaller relative to that required to clear an area as FM 3-24 describes. Of 
course, keeping these gated communities supplied is essential to holding 
them. Doing so will be challenging because of the dangers to land 
transport. 
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Consider Airminded Approaches to Supplying Fixed Locations 
 
An airminded approach to the transportation problem would consider a 
number of options. One might be, paradoxically for a country with vast oil 
reserves, using wind287 or solar power. Because electrical supplies are 
frequently disrupted and generators have significant fuel requirements, 
solar power especially could offer self-sustaining benefits. Airmen are 
already embracing this technology.288 
 
An additional technique to offset insurgent tactics against logistical lines 
of communication would be to airlift vital materials so as to minimize the 
need for surface resupply. Those “oil spots” with airfields could be 
supplied by air-landed provisions. American airlift, General McCaffrey 
tells us, “flew 13,000 truckloads of material into Iraq for pinpoint 
distribution last year.”289 Moreover, pinpoint distribution by air no longer 
requires an airstrip. High technology has reached airdrop processes, and 
this could significantly reduce the risk.  
 
Specifically, US airpower is undergoing a “revolution in airdrop 
technology.”290 The Joint Precision Delivery System (JPADS) is a system 
for which the Army serves as technical manager291 (but which was 
developed from Air Force basic research292). It allows precision airdrop 
from 24,000 feet and higher—well above the threat altitudes that bedevil 
rotary-wing operations.293 Thus, JPADS diminishes the enemy’s 
opportunity to inflict casualties. USA Today reports, “The precision 
airdrop system is seen as a way of minimizing danger to convoys, which 
are frequent targets of roadside bombs. It can also quickly resupply troops 
on the far-flung battlefields.”294 While JPADS will probably never replace 
surface convoys, experiments will soon begin with bundles weighing up to 
60,000 pounds. This leads experts to conclude, “The sky is the limit on 
where this can go for improving operations on the battlefield”.295 
 
Beyond using airpower to supply vital locations, airmindedness may 
provide innovative approaches to enhance the security of fixed locations. 
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Consider Airminded Approaches to Securing Fixed Locations 
 
Of particular relevance to COIN operations—and especially with respect 
to securing the oil-spot locations—is the transformation Air Force 
Security Forces (SF) have undergone. It is quite true that today’s SF career 
field “barely resembles its own Air Force specialty code from a decade 
ago.”296 As a result of policy decisions in the 2005 timeframe now 
enshrined in joint doctrine,297 the Air Force was obliged to take over 
responsibility to defend air bases “outside the wire.”  
 
Airmen have shown that when the issue is ground defense of a fixed 
location, they can succeed by applying airmindedness. Specifically, the 
Air Force applied its own organizational theory and technological 
expertise to develop a unique approach to air base defense. It was 
demonstrated with great success at Balad Air Base, Iraq, during Operation 
Safeside,298 a 60-day drive to quell hundreds of mortar and rocket attacks 
launched from a particularly vexing sector of the perimeter. According to 
the Airmen involved, the operation’s achievements: 
 
Dispelled the perception that Army units are better 
organized, trained, and equipped than Air Force security 
forces to conduct such operations. Unlike previous Army 
units, the task force achieved the desired effect.299  
 
The Air Force now has specially-trained ground-force units, including the 
airborne-capable 820th Security Forces Group,300 ready to apply its 
distinctive approach to securing particular areas from insurgent attacks, an 
obvious advantage in COIN situations. 
 
The Air Force continues to look for other technological solutions 
especially suited for the COIN environment. Currently, Security Forces 
are testing the Active Denial System which is designed “to engage and 
repel human targets by projecting a beam of energy that creates an 
intolerable heating sensation on the skin.”301 This is technology originally 
developed by the Air Force Research Laboratory.302 Those who would 
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seek to drain money out of technological research would do well to 
remember all the war-fighting advantages it has produced. 
 
Technology requires training. FM 3-24 rightly emphasizes training, and 
Airmen may have ideas to complement the doctrine in that regard. 
 
Consider Innovative Training Options for Iraqis 
 
FM 3-24, like almost all COIN literature, emphasizes the importance of 
training host-nation security forces.303 It does, however, speak in terms of 
“local training centers.”304 Training Iraqis in Iraq is difficult.305 
Technology is available that can facilitate such training,306 but even high-
tech solutions are impeded by the “lack of security in some places as well 
as the sectarian violence.”307 Moreover, US trainers embedded with Iraqi 
forces are particularly vulnerable.308 
 
It may be useful, therefore, to consider other options. One would be to 
train more Iraqis, perhaps thousands more, outside of Iraq. Such training 
ought to target junior and mid-level officers and NCOs. These are Iraq’s 
security forces’ real future, and they could themselves become in-country 
trainers, reducing the US footprint as Admiral Fallon desires.309  
 
Col Pete Mansoor,310 a COIN expert who was one of FM 3-24’s drafters, 
discussed the advantages of training outside of Iraq in a 2005 interview: 
 
The great advantage is the security is much better. You 
don’t have to guard the installation to the degree you have 
to in Iraq…. Another advantage is if it’s staffed by foreign 
officers, they don’t have to come into Iraq and become 
targets in order to teach. Also, existing facilities can be 
used that don’t require a lot of renovation or rebuilding, as 
is the case with many buildings in Iraq.311 
Moving training out of Iraq—to include, as appropriate, to the United 
States—fits with an airminded approach because of its strategic 
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advantages. It is better configured for the Long War because it would deny 
the enemy the opportunity to cause American (and to some extent Iraqi) 
casualties, and would reduce the deployment tempo for US troops.  
 
Furthermore, one of the most difficult yet essential tasks in Iraqi force 
development is the inculcation of “values and ethics.”312 As already 
indicated, avoiding the stresses and dangers of a combat zone could only 
lessen the difficulty. In addition, moving training to locations where the 
values and ethics to be taught are the norm should further increase the 
probability of their inculcation. If, for example, training occurred in the 
United States, Iraqis could experience first-hand the ideals of a free 
society—a great way to win hearts and minds. 
 
Airmen (as do members of other armed services) have a long tradition of 
training foreign military personnel that has proven to be an effective way 
of building positive relationships. Because many Iraqis do not speak 
English, however, language can be an obstacle in establishing US-based 
training.313 Fortunately, in the Air Force there is precedent for conducting 
training in a foreign language, the Inter-American Air Forces Academy 
(IAAFA).314 Importantly, IAAFA provides “exposure to the US culture, 
government, and peoples”315 to members of foreign militaries. To date, 
however, there is no Arabic counterpart to IAAF, and that should change. 
 
Obviously, prudent steps would need to be taken to ensure Iraqis are 
properly vetted and are not able to desert the training.316 The training 
might also be used to promote national unity, which is needed because the 
concept of national identity is still “overshadowed by tribe, imam, family, 
and ethnicity.”317 Thus, it would be helpful to configure the classes with 
mixed ethnic groups so as to, again, promote pluralism and begin the long 
evolution from tribal identities to a true, national allegiance—the absence 
of which is one of the real stumbling blocks in standing up Iraqi (and other 
host-nation) COIN forces. 
 
This same concept may have application beyond training counter-
insurgency forces. FM 3-24 emphasizes the importance of establishing 
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host-nation governmental institutions. The problem is, again, training a 
new generation of Iraqis with technical skills as well as loyalty to a greater 
Iraq. As with military forces, building such a cadre amid the chaos of 
today’s Iraq is extremely difficult.  
 
It may be possible to synergize productively the need to train civilian 
Iraqis for governmental duties with the US forces’ need for translators. 
Language skills are so central to the COIN effort that FM 3-24 dedicates  
an appendix (one larger than the airpower appendix) to linguistic 
support.318 Huge resources are being applied against this problem. The 
Army alone is issuing a $4.6 billion contract for translation services.319  
 
Perhaps a portion of that money could be diverted to bring Iraqis to the 
United States for language training as well as schooling in governmental 
tasks. This idea would require that the trainees provide some period of 
service as a translator—perhaps in an Iraqi ministry or for COIN forces 
with the approval of Iraqi government.  
 
Diverting even a quarter of the sum earmarked for translators for US 
forces could provide thousands of Iraqis the same opportunity to gain 
exposure to the US culture, government, and people and to build personal 
relationships with American counterparts as military programs have done 
for members of other foreign armed forces.  
 
Advanced translation technology donated to the US military may be able 
to mitigate the short-term complications this plan might engender.320 
Technology also speaks to one of the most difficult problems in the COIN 
fight: intelligence. 
 
Do Not Overemphasize Human Intelligence  
 
Like virtually all COIN writings, FM 3-24 contends that counter-
insurgency is “an intelligence-driven endeavor.”321 It favors human intel-
ligence (HUMINT)322 declaring that “all Soldiers and Marines [function] 
as potential collectors”323 and that “during COIN operations, much 
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intelligence is based on information gathered from people.”324 This is 
consistent with Army COIN literature that designates HUMINT as “being 
the priority effort” for intelligence professionals.325 
 
Certainly, Airmen do not discount the value of human intelligence, and 
readily agree that in “many cases HUMINT is the best and only source of 
adversary intentions.”326 Airmen, nevertheless, consider it only one 
contributor to the overall intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 
(ISR) picture. They view HUMINT’s main use as “amplify, clarify, or 
verify” information327 collected by technical assets, of which the air 
component has many, both airborne and space-based. As the air 
component usually has little in the way of HUMINT resources, it relies 
primarily on other government agencies for it.328 
 
If it sounds like Airmen have less enthusiasm for HUMINT than do the 
COIN aficionados, consider the observations of historian John Keegan in 
his magisterial book, Intelligence in War: Knowledge of the Enemy from 
Napoleon to Al-Qaeda.329 Keegan notes, somewhat surprisingly, “Human 
intelligence played almost no part in determining the conditions under 
which most of the campaigns which form the case studies in [this] book 
were fought.”330 Even more remarkably, Keegan goes on to warn that 
“intelligence, however good, is not necessarily the means to victory.” 331 
 
This is especially so if HUMINT is overly relied upon. As FM 3-24 
realizes, HUMINT can be the source of misinformation, sometimes 
deliberate. There are indications that this has occurred in Iraq, and with 
counterproductive results.332 Obviously, there are many reasons HUMINT 
may be unreliable, and its accuracy may largely depend on the subjective 
reasoning of the source as to what to say to COIN forces. 
 
Practical problems of collecting HUMINT clearly emerge in an 
occupation scenario, especially as in Iraq where support for US forces is 
not strong. According to an Army officer who served in Iraq, there are 
limits to what a “PFC with an M16” can accomplish in terms of 
intelligence collection, to include that he “cannot make the Iraqis willing 
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to risk disclosing the locations of known insurgent cells when they do not 
believe in the US mission.”333 
 
Lt Gen Ronald Burgess, a senior Army intelligence officer, acknowledges 
that the COIN environment lends itself to HUMINT, but “that doesn’t 
mean you have to do that at the expense of national technical 
collection.”334 Intelligence developed from technical sources may, in fact, 
be more reliable. For example, listening to what insurgents say to each 
other—unfiltered by a human intermediary source—may provide better 
insights. The same is true for imagery, especially when provided in real-
time as airborne platforms are capable of doing. Increasingly, innovation 
plays an important role as fighters and other “aircraft [perform] in non-
traditional ISR roles with their electro-optical and infrared sensors.”335 
 
Technical intelligence gathering offers the possibility of achieving an 
asymmetrical advantage over opponents who either are unaware of its 
capabilities or underestimate them. According to experts, “Digital 
footprints terrorists leave behind on laptops, cell phones, and Palm Pilot-
type devices are providing a means to find them.”336 Just such lack of 
knowledge may have been fatal to the insurgent leader Abu Musab al-
Zarqawi, who was killed in an air attack in June of 2006.337 Journalist 
Mark Bowden reports: 
 
Electronic intercepts may have helped confirm that 
Rahman was meeting with Zarqawi in the house (the 
terrorist leader never used cell phones, which are relatively 
easy to track, but he did use satellite phones, which are 
harder to pinpoint, but not—as he apparently assumed—
impossible).338 
Events like this emphasize the psychological dimension of technical 
intelligence collection; that is, insurgents never really know the 
capabilities of the collection systems and, therefore, are forced to assume 
that they are always being monitored. In fact, airpower’s capability to 
persistently collect is increasingly pervasive with the advent of long-
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duration airborne platforms like Global Hawk339 and full-time, persistent 
space-based systems to complement other technological means.  
 
Among other things, this persistence and invasiveness help to inflict stress 
and Clausewitzean “friction” upon insurgent operations. When combined 
with HUMINT operations that generate distrust and suspicion among 
enemy leaders, the intelligence collection process itself can become 
weaponized to add value to the COIN fight beyond the data collected. 
 
Optimally, HUMINT and technical intelligence capabilities will be well-
coordinated in COIN operations. Unfortunately, Inside the Pentagon 
claims that the lack of coordination between the two has “frustrated 
military personnel at all levels of command” and has “hampered U.S. 
effectiveness in Iraq.”340 Maximizing these capabilities will clearly benefit 
the COIN war fighter. Likewise, merging intelligence and operations 
efforts is, as Gen Lance Smith, commander of Joint Forces Command, put 
it, “one of the critical elements of being able to fight this long war.” 341 
Intelligence-sharing technologies can aid that process. 
 
In this vein, Secretary of the Air Force Michael Wynne is calling for 
development of what he terms, “spherical situational awareness.”342 This 
is accomplished by tightly integrating and orchestrating a variety of 
sensors and information systems to create “a comprehensive view, at once 
vertical and horizontal, real-time and predictive, penetrating and defended 
in the cyber realm.”343 As discussed below, the “cyber realm” is extremely 
important to winning the COIN fight. 
 
Maximize Airmen’s Expertise in Cyberspace  
and Information Operations 
 
Cyberspace, the “physical domain within the electro-magnetic 
environment,”344 is the newest entry to airpower’s portfolio. To this end, 
the Air Force has established a cyberspace command345 aimed at 
maintaining dominance not just in communications and information 
technology but also “superiority across the entire electromagnetic 
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spectrum.”346 Given the “inherently technical … nature” of cyberspace 
operations,347 it fits naturally with the culture of Airmen.  
 
Moreover, cyber operations are a direct expression of an airminded 
approach. As the Air Force’s draft doctrine on irregular warfare points out, 
“Like air operations, cyber operations can strike directly at the node of 
interest without first defeating ‘fielded forces.’”348 Properly executed, 
cyber operations minimize the enemy’s opportunity to inflict casualties 
that might otherwise result from close combat. 
 
Consequently, in perhaps no other area is the anti-technology view of 
some COIN traditionalists more off target.349 Actually, in the cyber arena, 
high technology is not only central to peer-competitor, conventional war; 
it is also one of the most revolutionary features of putatively low-tech 
COIN environments. Max Boot, the author of War Made New: 
Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today, points 
out that Islamist insurgents rely heavily on information technologies that 
“barely existed in 1980.”350 Gen Ronald Keys, the commander of Air 
Combat Command, provides more detail: 
 
The terrorists are using cyberspace now, remotely 
detonating roadside bombs. Terrorists use global positio-
ning satellites and satellite communications; use the 
Internet for financial transactions, radar and navigation 
jammings, blogs, chat rooms and bulletin boards aimed at 
our cognitive domain; e-mail, chat and others providing 
shadowy command and control; and finally overt and 
covert attacks on our servers.351 
Airmen work to place an “‘information umbrella, over friends and foes 
alike.”352 Although in many areas there are legal constraints as to what 
may be done in cyberspace, such restrictions may be less of an issue in 
Iraq. Lt Gen Abboud Gamber, the Iraqi commander in charge of the  
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Baghdad security effort, declared that under Iraqi law the government 
could “search, control, and seize all parcel post, mail, telegraphs, [and] 
communication devices as needed.”353 
 
Information operations (IO) are integral to cyberspace capability, and 
Airmen, especially in the Air Force, consider them a “distinctive 
capability” of their component.354 Thus, an airminded approach would 
look for opportunities to exploit technological means to “influence, 
disrupt, corrupt, or usurp” the unconventional kinds of command and 
control systems insurgents are using.355 
 
If, as is recommended above, high-risk clearing operations are to be 
minimized, an aggressive airminded approach may be required to prevent 
“uncleared” areas from becoming electronic command and control 
sanctuaries. One author offers an “extreme proposal” that could be worth 
considering: “completely shut down the information grid in the insurgent 
areas—telephones, cellular towers, and so on.”356 The proposal raises 
complex issues but does have the attractive feature of being virtually 
casualty free. 
 
Information Operations and Strategic Communication 
 
For Airmen, IO includes “influence operations” (although they are 
separate from traditional public affairs functions).357 Unfortunately, this is 
an area where the United States has been particularly unsuccessful.  
 
In January 2007, Newsweek headlined, accurately, that the United States is 
“Losing the Infowar” in Iraq.358 This difficulty is not a new one,359 but 
what is especially frustrating about the report is that the insurgents, as 
General Keys also notes, are exploiting technology to defeat American 
efforts. Specifically Newsweek says, “Insurgents using simple cell-phone 
cameras, laptop editing programs and the Web are beating the United 
States in the fierce battle for Iraqi public opinion.”360 
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As suggested above, extreme measures can be taken to deny insurgents 
access to, or use of, these technologies. Some situations, such as a reported 
unauthorized television station broadcasting from within Iraq, ought to be 
relatively easy to interdict technically (although it has evidently proven 
difficult).361 This station’s anti-American invective has made the broadcast 
outlet the “face” of the insurgency within Iraq.362 Shutting it down would 
appear to clearly benefit the COIN effort363 and would seem to be in 
keeping with democratic values. 
 
In any event, shutting down such sources may be the only way to control 
enemy propaganda that is dangerously inciting violence in certain areas. If 
such action is taken, a low-tech airpower means might be used to replace, 
in part, the information the host-nation population would lose: air-
delivered leaflets—a technique that already has been used with success in 
Iraq.364 Additionally, Commando Solo365 aircraft can broadcast 
appropriate messages to otherwise denied areas. 
 
More problematic is utilizing military deception at this point in Iraq. 
Although an internationally-accepted means of warfare,366 care must be 
taken to ensure it complies with US367 and Iraqi law, as well as the 
political aims of both countries. Still, COIN expert Bard O’Neill advises 
that “propaganda and disinformation campaigns” to discredit insurgent 
leaders can be effective.368  
 
This is another idea that is not especially new. Back in 1995 Thomas 
Czerwinski, then a professor at the School of Information Warfare of the 
National Defense University, postulated one scenario: “What would 
happen if you took Saddam Hussein’s image, altered it, and projected it 
back to Iraq showing him voicing doubts about his own Baath Party?”369 If 
this concept can be updated effectively to apply to today’s insurgent 
leaders in Iraq, it deserves careful consideration. 
 
Influence operations must also have positive, accurate messages—what 
might be called a “compelling counter-narrative.”370 Such a narrative helps 
to separate the insurgents from sources of support, an aim of many COIN 
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strategies.371 In Iraq, this is an especially complex task as there may be, as 
one analyst put it, as many as four “wars” ongoing simultaneously.372 
These different wars overlap but vary widely. Designing messages and 
selecting targets for them that would have the effect of disrupting or even 
severing the support insurgents need is extremely difficult. 
 
Cultural and Democratic Considerations:  
Reaching out to Women 
 
There does appear to be one segment of the Iraqi population cutting across 
groups and sects that is a potential US ally: women. Women are arguably 
the largest oppressed group in Iraq,373 and war widows are especially 
suffering now.374 Most experts agree that women have much to lose if 
extremists take hold.375 
 
Reaching out to women is an idea that has resonance in classic 
counterinsurgency theory. David Galula’s Pacification in Algeria: 1956-
1958 discusses just such an effort with subjugated Kabyle women during 
France’s Algerian COIN operation.376 Furthermore, recent scholarship 
indicates that empowerment of women leads to clear economic and 
political gains, particularly when they assume leadership roles.377 In 
today’s Algeria, Muslim women are emerging as the nation’s “most potent 
force for social change [and are] having a potentially moderating and 
modernizing influence on society.”378 
 
Positive messages to women about the value of a democracy that respects 
individual rights and offers opportunities for participation must be 
matched with complementary action. One innovative possibility would be 
to establish secure compounds, along the lines of the Rule of Law 
Complex discussed above, explicitly designed to aid women. Among other 
things, providing a secure environment for women’s educational and 
organizational opportunities could catalyze the winning of the hearts and 
minds of a potentially decisive part of Iraqi society. 
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To be sure, many influential Iraqis oppose women’s rights. Edward 
Luttwak reports that clerics say that women’s rights are “only 
propagandized [by the United States] to persuade Iraqi daughters and 
wives to dishonor families by imitating the shameless nakedness and 
impertinence of Western women.”379 Nevertheless, there may be real 
opportunity to reach out to a substantial portion of the population that 
could benefit greatly. This could be the kind of hearts-and-minds initiative 
that should be proactively explored to achieve COIN success. 
 
Develop Truly Joint Approach that Respects  
the Airman’s Expertise 
 
To some observers FM 3-24 raises the issue of control of airpower.  
According to Air Force Magazine, for example, the manual argues, in 
effect, “that airpower is best put under control of a tactical ground 
commander or, at the highest level, the multinational force commander, 
but not an airman.”380 Actually, FM 3-24 does not explicitly make that 
assertion, though clearly its overall tenor is that all aspects of the COIN 
fight are within the ground commander’s purview. 
 
Of course, to Airmen it is an article of faith, embedded in doctrine, that 
“Airmen work for Airmen” so as to preserve the principles of unity of 
command and simplicity.381 Regardless of what one may think of Air 
Force Magazine’s contention about FM 3-24 and the control of airpower, 
the important point is that the airmindedness of Airmen can ensure that the 
full capabilities of airpower are brought to bear on the COIN challenge. 
 
To ensure the Airman’s expertise is properly utilized requires building 
greater trust between the ground and air components. To do that, however, 
means overcoming what seems to be an entrenched belief among some in 
the Army that the Air Force disdains close air support. This is ironic since, 
for example, about 79 percent of the targets struck by airpower during OIF 
fell into that category.382 Also troubling is Lt Gen Tom McInerney’s 
(USAF, retired) report of signs that the Army wants to build, in effect, its  
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own “air force”383—even though the Army has not always demonstrated 
the same level of expertise in handling aviation assets as it has with 
ground forces. 
 
A recent example from OIF might prove instructive. In a just-published 
article in Joint Forces Quarterly,384 Maj Robert J. Seifert points out that 
today AC-130385 gunships are controlled by ground commanders who 
limit them to providing air cover to specific units. This makes the aircraft 
unavailable to attack emerging targets in another unit’s area of operations. 
Major Seifert contends this is something of a reversion to the airpower 
control practices that proved so inefficient in North Africa during World 
War II. Seifert suggests a more airminded approach: allow the gunships to 
achieve their full potential by putting the weapon in an “on call” status 
continually linked to JTACs in several units (or other aircraft) so that each 
sortie can be optimized.386 
 
It is not necessary to break up the synergy of dedicated air/land/sea 
organization of the special operations forces (SOF) to address Major 
Seifert’s concerns. Establishing joint policy that SOF-assigned airpower 
capabilities in excess of SOF requirements will be made available to the 
air component for planning and execution (similar to existing joint 
doctrine regarding Marine Corps aviation) would be a good start. In 
addition, tighter relationships with the AOC could make sorties more 
adaptable to real-time dynamics and, therefore, more productive.  
Leveraging today’s communications capabilities and linkages may provide 
opportunities not heretofore possible.  
 
Today’s AOCs give Airmen the unique ability to “see” the overall theater 
of operations and to communicate with the many air platforms. All of this 
enables Airmen to rapidly exploit a central advantage of airpower: 
flexibility. Still, there is no substitute for planning because the 
complexities of twenty-first century air operations are daunting and 
require special expertise.  
 
 59
The reality is that American ground-force commanders often do not 
understand how to use airpower effectively and efficiently. Consider the 
Army’s nearly-disastrous Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan. It appears 
from Seymour Hersh’s Chain of Command that Army leaders mistakenly 
thought that they “could do [the operation] on [their] own,”387 with little 
air component assistance. 
 
As a result, the air component was brought into the planning process very 
late and was not permitted to conduct major preparatory strikes.388 
Although fixed-wing airpower eventually rescued the operation from 
serious difficulties and accounted for most of the terrorists killed,389 the 
Army commander nonetheless denigrated the Air Force’s efforts in a 
subsequent magazine interview.390 
 
What the interview really demonstrates is the degree to which this senior 
ground commander lacked sufficient understanding of airpower 
capabilities to ensure optimal planning. Although Ben Lambeth’s analysis 
of Operation Anaconda in Air Power Against Terror was too gentle, it still 
concluded that “those who planned and initiated Operation Anaconda 
failed to make the most of the potential synergy of air, space, and 
landpower that was available to them.”391 Indeed, that unfamiliarity—
reflected in FM 3-24’s airpower annex—evidently persists. 
 
As documented in daily news, today’s airpower capabilities often amaze 
ground commanders. One candidly expressed his astonishment about an 
incident in Iraq where an F-15 used its sensors to follow individual 
insurgents as they tried to hide in reeds near a river. The commander 
related: “I’d walked in the dark within ten feet of one guy and [the 
aircraft] sparkled the target right behind me, told the [ground controller] to 
tell me to turn around.”392 He was then able to capture the otherwise 
hidden insurgents. 
 
Given the myths about airpower in FM 3-24, it is unsurprising that ground 
commanders are not being educated on its potential. This is hurting the 
COIN effort. One battalion commander admitted that in his first few 
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months in Iraq he “rarely put air into [his] plan … because [he] did not 
understand how it could assist us in the counterinsurgency fight.”393 
 
When it does consider airpower, FM 3-24 clearly favors rotary-wing 
options. For example, it speaks of “technological advances” that “greatly 
[increase] the accuracy and utility of helicopter airdrops” for sustainment.  
Unfortunately, the survivability of helicopters is becoming increasingly 
suspect. One of the few Iraqi successes during the conventional phase of 
OIF occurred in March of 2003 when Iraqis used ordinary cell phones to 
orchestrate an ambush of Apache helicopters394 that left 27 of 33 unable to 
fly.395  
 
Even more disturbing are 2007 reports that Iraqi insurgents are fielding 
capabilities that exploit rotary-wing vulnerabilities.396 Although Army 
attack helicopter enthusiasts continue to argue for the efficacy of the 
weapon in the close fight,397 it seems Air Force fixed-wing aircraft like the 
A-10398 (which is highly survivable in the COIN environment) are more 
prudent choices for the strike mission.399 
 
Airmen controlling airpower produces a unique benefit for the COIN fight 
because it allows counterinsurgency forces to capitalize on a gap in 
insurgents’ understanding of military power. In fact, COIN forces can 
dominate thanks to airpower’s asymmetric advantage if Airmen are 
allowed to exercise their expertise advantage. Doing so has great potential 
because there are few examples of insurgents who really understand the 
capabilities of modern airpower. Such gaps have caused insurgents to 
make catastrophic mistakes.  
 
There is no reason to believe Iraqi insurgents have any particular expertise 
in high-technology, fixed-wing airpower, even among elite members of 
the former regime’s armed forces. In the aftermath of the destruction of 
the Republican Guard by air attack during OIF, a stunned Iraqi Army 
officer expressed his frustration about his leadership: “They forgot we 
were missing airpower. American technology is beyond belief.”400 
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And More 
 
There are many other possibilities to creatively exploit airpower and 
technology to the benefit of the counterinsurgency effort, and especially 
those capabilities that would reduce reliance on American boots-on-the-
ground. Some of these innovations are already in use or are nearing 
readiness to enter the fight. A few examples follow. 
 
Protecting Iraqi infrastructure has been a major challenge401—and one that 
COIN efforts historically have faced. Today’s airpower, however, has the 
persistence and the ability to use technology to leverage the ratio of force 
to space—elements proven to be critical to effective COIN strategies.402 
Thus, techniques like employing patrolling fighter aircraft to conduct 
“infrastructure-security missions” instead of simply orbiting while 
awaiting calls403 is the kind of innovation that can help secure vital Iraqi 
oil and electricity systems. To do so successfully still requires ground 
forces, but in smaller numbers than would otherwise be needed because of 
the size of the areas involved.404 
 
Most COIN studies emphasize the need for border security.405 In a new 
preface to his classic history, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, 
Alistair Horne notes that there is a parallel to that conflict and the 
insurgency in Iraq: the importance to the insurgents of support from other 
countries.406 Airpower can assist in degrading the insurgents’ ability to 
obtain assistance from abroad by surveilling borders and interdicting 
unauthorized transits. As with infrastructure protection, airpower can 
obviate the need for large numbers of surface forces. The newly-fielded 
MQ-9 Reaper407 appears ideally suited to provide the persistence this 
surveillance mission requires, as well as the ability to take decisive kinetic 
action when needed. 
 
Beyond interdicting cross-border transits, airpower can deter nations 
disposed to assist the insurgency. Even if one assumes, as James S. Corum 
and Wray R. Johnson do in Airpower in Small Wars, that COIN conflicts 
“rarely present lucrative targets for aerial attack, and even more rarely is 
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there ever a chance for airpower to be employed in a strategic bombing 
campaign or even in attack operations on any large scale,”408 that is not the 
case with nation-states supporting insurgents. They present a surfeit of 
targets and have economies vulnerable to air-delivered coercion.409 
 
This latter truth raises another aspect of airpower: it is the ultimate Plan B. 
FM 3-24 identifies “protracted popular war” as one of the common 
insurgent approaches. In Phase III of this method, insurgents “transition 
from guerilla warfare to conventional warfare.”410 Because insurgents 
rarely have much capability or experience with airpower,411 they are 
especially vulnerable to the air weapon during this stage.  
 
Not every insurgent movement passes through this “conventional” stage—
and it is even questionable whether some ever intend to take over the 
governments they are attacking.412 Nevertheless, at some point most 
insurgencies seek to assume power. If for some reason they succeed, 
airpower can debilitate—if not destroy—their ability to function as a 
government or to threaten US interests. What Col Jeffrey Barnett argued 
in 1996 is just as true today: “It’s important to emphasize the ability of 
high-technology airpower to deny insurgent victory over an extended time 
with minimal risk of US casualties.”413 
 
Finally, Professors Metz and Millen contend that containment strategies 
may be “more logical”414 than other approaches in “liberation” insurgency 
scenarios (which appear to be analogous to David Kilcullen’s “resistance 
warfare” insurgency415) such as today’s Iraq. Air and naval power proved 
quite effective enforcing the “no-fly zone” and sanctions against Iraq,416 
and—in conjunction with ground-force raids and strikes—could again 
provide a way to protect US interests by containing the effects of an 
insurgency in Iraq or elsewhere. 
 
Obviously 
 
This is certainly not a complete list of all the possible considerations an 
Airman would bring to an airminded COIN doctrine or, quite possibly, not 
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even the most important ones. Some or all might properly be viewed as 
tactics, techniques, and procedures as opposed to doctrinal elements. At 
best, this is a list of illustrations to show how an Airman’s perspective 
could enlarge and enhance FM 3-24 into a more joint approach to how the 
difficult problem of counterinsurgency in the twenty-first century might be 
addressed. 
Concluding Observations 
Notwithstanding the critiques of FM 3-24 in this essay, it remains a stellar 
work of scholarship and military theory that skillfully presents the ground 
force perspective. What is more is that it is plainly appropriate and fully 
workable in certain situations—especially for armies in COIN fights 
where the United States is not involved and modern airpower capabilities 
are not available. 
 
Of immediate concern, however, is whether the media’s designation of 
FM 3-24 as The Book for Iraq is the right characterization.417 As valuable 
as FM 3-24 may be in other circumstances, a doctrine that calls for 
enormous numbers of American troops to wage counterinsurgency for “a 
generation” in Iraq should not be the only “blueprint”418 military 
professionals are offering decision-makers.  
 
Yes, a troop “surge” may afford some temporary relief in Iraq, but the 
surge is not, per se, an implementation of FM 3-24’s hearts-and-minds 
strategy. It is purely the application of military force, something the 
manual rejects as a COIN solution. It is a mistake to interpret whatever 
success the surge produces as necessarily being a validation of FM 3-24’s 
main theories. 
 
Of course, Airmen do not disagree that the application of overwhelming 
military force can eventually crush any insurgency.419 The problem is that 
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a COIN strategy that requires massive numbers of American boots-on-the-
ground is not sustainable—nor should it be sustained. In a world where 
existential threats to US interests are emerging, a commitment of blood 
and treasure for an extended period cannot be justified if it means 
compromising the ability to confront the gravest threats. 
 
This is emphatically not a plea to abandon the counterinsurgency effort in 
Iraq. Rather, it is a call for the full potential of airpower to be integrated 
into a more complete joint and interdependent COIN doctrine to address 
the conundrum of Iraq.420 Maximizing airpower in all its dimensions 
represents one of the few possibilities to either provide near-term success 
of the military element of an overall COIN strategy or, alternatively, 
provide a military component with “staying power” that is sustainable 
(along with a smaller ground presence) over the length of time ground-
component COIN experts believe is required.  
 
Again, the challenge for military strategists is to devise pragmatic options 
within the resources realistically available to political leaders. Because 
airpower’s capabilities, as well as the Airman’s way of thinking, have at 
least the potential to reduce the difficulties occasioned by large numbers 
of American boots-on-the-ground, they ought to be fully explored. 
 
Accordingly, beyond Iraq, a truly joint doctrine needs to be re-aligned to 
produce more realistic and efficient COIN options for the United States in 
the twenty-first century. The doctrine must fit within an overall defense 
strategy that faces multiple and diverse demands across the spectrum of 
conflict.  
 
Airmen agree that FM 3-24 brilliantly re-enforces innumerable tactical 
and operational considerations vital to any military operation. Moreover, it 
would be churlish and wrong, for example, to find fault with any effort to 
improve leadership and ethics as chapter 7 of the manual does.421 In fact, 
the inclusion of such guidance is one of FM 3-24’s many strengths and 
should find a place in joint COIN doctrine. 
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What is, however, a concern is that FM 3-24 is being used (albeit not by 
its drafters) as a rationale to inflate the size of the Army and Marine 
Corps, a development that threatens to drain resources and energy away 
from airpower and other high-tech defense capabilities.422 One need not 
doubt, as one of the contributors to FM 3-24 insists, that the writers of the 
doctrine had “no strategic agenda”423 to nevertheless conclude that it is 
having strategic effect.  
 
Shortly after FM 3-24’s issuance, the President called for increasing “the 
size of the active Army and Marine Corps, so that America has the Armed 
Forces we need for the twenty-first century.”424 A day later, the secretary 
of defense requested increases over the next five years of 65,000 Soldiers 
and 27,000 Marines to “provide the necessary forces for success in the 
long war on terror.”425  
 
Yet decisions today—based on FM 3-24 or anything else—to enlarge the 
ranks of US ground forces will not make them available in time to make a 
difference in Iraq.426 As one editorial put it: 
 
The buildup will do nothing to ease the current operational 
stresses caused by the war in Iraq. Even the Pentagon 
concedes it will take five years fully to recruit, train, and 
equip new units, so no new forces will enter the operational 
flow anytime soon. To the extent the sky is going to fall, it 
has already fallen.427 
 
More importantly, are more ground forces to fight lengthy irregular wars 
the most critical capability for “the Armed Forces we need for the twenty-
first century”? For all its seeming deference to Mao, Sun Tzu, and the 
Oriental way of war, FM 3-24 is, ironically, precipitating a national 
security architecture quite different from that the Asian heirs to FM 3-24’s 
sources are implementing.  
 
As it stands now, the United States is planning to increase its low-tech 
ground forces at the same time China, the twenty-first century’s emerging 
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superpower, is increasing its defense budget428 but shrinking its ground 
forces in favor of high-tech weaponry,429 and especially advanced 
airpower.430 In fact, according to DOD, China is in the process of 
transforming the People’s Liberation Army from “a mass army designed 
for protracted wars of attrition … to a more modern force capable of 
fighting short duration, high intensity conflicts against high-tech 
adversaries.”431 
 
Although USA Today reported in the fall of 2006 that 42 percent of the 
active duty Army—some 210,000 troops—had yet to deploy to either Iraq 
or Afghanistan,432 ground-force zealots continue to call for swelling the 
ranks of the US ground component at the expense of airpower.433 How 
much traction such arguments gain is still to be seen but, regardless, in 
light of FM 3-24 it is clear that Airmen have much work to do in 
educating the joint team—and especially those drafting the new joint 
COIN doctrine—as to what airpower has to offer.  
 
It is equally or even more important for Airmen to inform themselves of 
the intricacies of counterinsurgency, and particularly the challenges from 
the ground perspective. Airmen should not expect the land component, 
even if educated on airpower capabilities, to devise applications that will 
optimize air weapons.434 
 
The development of FM 3-24 also ought to serve as a “wake up call” for 
all Airmen to work harder to better develop warfighter-scholars. The 
ground component—the Army in particular—has done a superb job of 
creating a cadre of experts with phenomenal academic credentials who are 
informed by the “ground truth” of high-intensity combat experience.435 
Journalist Tom Ricks calls them a “band of warrior-intellectuals”436 and he 
is absolutely right. For its part, the Air Force tends to have Airmen with 
one qualification or the other, but rarely both. That must change. 
 
In addition, during the conceptualization phase of FM 3-24’s creation, the 
drafters assembled an “odd fraternity” of experts.437 This “unusual crowd” 
included “veterans of Vietnam and EI Salvador, representatives of human 
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rights nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and international organiza-
tions, academic experts, civilian agency representatives, [and] jour-
nalists.”438 
 
Debates may rage as to the degree to which Airmen were included, or 
should be included, in the writing of a component manual such as FM 3-
24. (Especially, one that is actually employed in the field as more than 
simply service doctrine.) Nevertheless, including the perspectives of 
persons outside the military community during the drafting process was a 
great innovation by the Army and Marine Corps. The complexities of 
twenty-first century, information-age conflicts make this idea well worth 
emulating, and it should be used in writing the new joint doctrine. 
 
Finally, Airmen—and airpower—will be most effective in the COIN fight 
if they are accepted as equals on a genuinely joint and interdependent 
team. This is why the development of joint COIN doctrine is so important 
to Airmen. It is imperative, however, that Airmen avoid—at all costs—
creating the impression that they are advocating a COIN solution that 
involves Airmen or airpower for their own sake. 
 
In the end, the need for truly joint counterinsurgency doctrine is not about 
Airmen or airpower being “shortchanged.” If we fail to bring the best 
thinking of the whole armed forces—along with the available capabilities 
of all the services—appropriately to bear in Iraq or any COIN conflict, it 
is the American people who are being shortchanged. We cannot allow that 
to happen, and that is why drafting an authentically joint COIN doctrine is 
of paramount importance. 
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